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Abstract 
In contemporary China, it is quite common for parents to offer financial as well as 
time transfers to their adult children. This research aims to dig out what factors 
can explain these tangible downward transfers. Three perspectives are generated 
based on previous research to provide potential explanations. The first two 
perspectives regard downward transfers as reflection of classical feedback model 
and responses to adult children’s needs due to the underdeveloped welfare system 
in contemporary China. The third perspective provides two competing 
mechanisms, namely rational self-interested and altruistic giving, to explain what 
is underlying the downward transfers described in the previous two perspectives. 
A raw database from CGSS2006 is applied and two analytical samples are 
selected to analyse these perspectives. Logistic regression is carried out to test 
three sets of models with three outcomes respectively: downward time transfers, 
downward financial transfers and parents’ happiness. Main predictors generated 
from theories include upward financial transfers, parents’ health and income 
levels, whether adult child is in a dual-worker family and whether there is a young 
third generation. Empirical findings have shown that downward transfers reflect a 
non-patrilineality feedback model and more importantly, it is mainly the altruistic 
parenting cultivated by family-oriented culture that is underlying these downward 
transfers. 
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1 
1 Introduction 
Traditional Chinese culture describes parenting as altruistic giving out. One 
popular metaphor to describe the intergenerational relationship in China is that 
parents raise their children as if they are paying back the debt that they have owed 
to their children in the past life1. What this metaphor shows is an invisible deep-
rooted idea that parents are supposed to take the very responsibility to take care of 
their children. Another widespread saying is that no matter how old the children 
have grown up to, they are always regarded as children by their parents and 
parents are always seeing them as those who need care and help. In contemporary 
China, it is quite common that even the children have got married and established 
their own family parents are still helping them in various ways. Even not living 
together, it is quite universal for parents to help with household duty for their 
adult children. For young couples having their own children, it is often the case 
that the grandparents are taking the main responsibility of looking after the third 
generation. During rush hours every workday, one can always see the elderly 
ferrying their grandchildren to and from school. Apart from all these time 
transfers, it is also not rare for parents to give money to their adult children.  
In this context, it is meaningful to dig into the question: why are parents 
supporting their adult children2? What can explain this phenomenon? Is it true that 
they are doing this just because of cultural heritage or only out of human nature as 
parents? Or are they doing this for other considerations? Previous research have 
provided some perspectives to understand these downward transfers given by 
parents to their adult children. Classical feedback model, as a cultural heritage, 
may be used to explain this downward transfer as an integral part of 
intergenerational exchange described in this model. Another different perspective 
argues that the downward transfers are parents responding to the needs of their 
adult children in contemporary China. These needs are illustrated to come from 
the increasing dual-worker families (the second generation) as well as 
underdeveloped welfare system particularly the system regarding pre-school 
education and care. To further understand both the classical feedback model as 
well as parents’ responses to their children’s needs, the third perspective presents 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 The underlying assumption in this metaphor is that parents and children are not in the same parents and 
children relationship in the past life. In the past life, they are only debtors and creditors.  
2 Since as many as three generations may be involved in this research, some clarification is necessary about the 
terminology issue. In this research, the first generation is referred to when “parents” or “the parental generation” 
are mentioned. The adult children of the first generation form the second generation or “the filial generation”. 
Some of adult children may have their own children. These children are the third generation and they are the 
grandchildren of the first generation. This research focuses on the downward transfers given by the first 
generation to the second generation.  
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two different mechanisms: rational self-interested and altruistic giving. Some 
scholars maintain that the rational mechanism is playing the crucial role and this 
mechanism is becoming more evident with decline in filial piety. While others 
argue that it is mainly the altruistic parenting nurtured by family-oriented culture 
that supports the downward transfers. Although all these perspectives have 
provided somewhat reasonable explanations about why parents are giving 
transfers to their adult children, no one has yet come up with a comprehensive 
analysis that integrating all these perspectives. By testing hypotheses derived from 
these different perspectives based on a database achieved from a nation-wide 
survey, this research contributes to drawing a more comprehensive picture about 
what factors give rise to the downward transfer. 
Downward transfers from parents to their adult children may come in various 
forms. To clarify, this research will involve two types of transfers, namely time 
transfers and financial transfers. The former one mainly refers to labour transfers, 
involving helping with household duty (such as cooking and cleaning), taking care 
of babies or other family members. The latter one of financial transfers points to 
the behaviour of giving money to adult children. In other words, this research will 
only discuss tangible transfers given by parents.  
Based on those perspectives provided by previous research, several models are 
built to look into downward time and financial transfers given by the parental 
generation applying logistic regression. The results have shown that traditional 
feedback model still provides an exact description of reciprocal care for the 
intergenerational relationship in contemporary China: there is a significant 
relationship between downward time transfers and upward financial transfers. 
However, data cannot show very strong evidence for the argument that parents are 
giving transfers as a response to their adult children’s needs if the adult children 
are a dual-worker family (especially those with a young grandchild). What data 
have shown is a significant relationship between downward time transfers and 
whether there is a young grandchild (the third generation) in all cases, and this 
significance disappeared when only including cases where the second generation 
are dual-worker families. In this case, it would be more reasonable to conclude 
that it is parents’ own willingness to help more when there is a young third 
generation rather than they are responding to the adult children’s needs as a dual-
worker family with a young grandchild. Other results have also strengthened this 
altruistic parenting nurtured by family-oriented culture: parents will devote more 
financial transfers to adult children if they earn higher income and more time 
transfers will be delivered if parents are in better health condition. To conclude, 
the downward transfers are more than reciprocal care revealed by the feedback 
model. As the traditional family-oriented culture indicates, parents are always 
willing to help their adult children, especially when there is young third 
generation.  
This thesis will start with theoretical section, in which previous research will 
be analysed and hypotheses will be generated. After that, research design will be 
introduced, explaining how data is collected and what statistical models will be 
applied. Results of data analysis will be presented after this, based on which 
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analysis and discussion would be made. Finally, it will end with limitation and 
conclusion of this research. 
 
 
 
 
4 
2 Theory 
In order to answer the research question, first of all I refer to previous studies 
regarding intergenerational relationship in this theoretical section. Among these 
previous research, the downward transfers discussed here from the parental 
generation to the filial generation have not gained as much attention as other 
issues like aging or the role of family in old-age care. In fact, very few studies 
treat these downward transfers as the main focus of research and in most cases 
scholars regard these transfers just as one component of intergenerational 
interaction. This research aims at contributing to the filling of this gap by building 
a general picture explaining why parents are giving out the downward transfers 
based on previous research.  
To achieve this aim, this theoretical section will be arranged as follows: three 
perspectives that may provide potential explanations (important potential 
predictors) for why parents give transfers to their adult children will first be 
discussed through integrating previous related research. After that, a brief analysis 
will be made to introduce other relative factors (control variables) when analysing 
the downward transfers. Finally, aim of this research will be introduced based on 
previous literature review. Following I will start with introducing the three 
perspectives based on previous studies.  
 
2.1 Three perspectives based on previous research 
In this main body of theoretical section, three perspectives will be illustrated one 
by one in this part. One is to regard the downward transfer just as reflection of the 
classical feedback model, indicating a certain social arrangement of reciprocal 
care. The second perspective, instead, emphasizes that downward transfers given 
by parents are responses to the second generation’s needs in contemporary China. 
Based on these two perspectives, the third perspective discusses what kind of 
mechanism (rational/altruistic) holds more weight in downward transfers 
described in previous two perspectives. One (rational mechanism) argues that 
with declining filial piety, the downward transfers are becoming the “investment” 
parents make with the expectation that they can get return from their adult 
children and to respond to children’s needs by giving downward transfers will 
cause burden for parents because they just do this out of social pressure. While the 
other (altruistic mechanism) asserts that the downward transfers given by parents 
just show parents’ willingness to help their children cultivated by family-oriented 
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culture. The following section will start with introducing the first perspective of 
classical feedback model.  
 
2.1.1 Classical feedback model 
As mentioned before, this perspective regards the downward transfer as a 
reflection of classical feedback model. This model was first raised by a Chinese 
sociologist Xiaotong Fei in the 1980s (1983) to describe this social arrangement 
of reciprocal care. He argued that unlike most western countries, intergenerational 
transfers in China are bilateral, including both downward transfers from parents to 
children as well as upward transfers from children to parents. The very basic logic 
behind this intergenerational interaction could be described by a well-known 
proverb in China, that is parents bringing up children and children will look after 
them when they get old (yang’erfanglao). Following figure 2.1.1.1 provides a 
simple model of this reciprocal care. (Di et al, 2008, 86) F1, F2 and F3 represent 
the first, second and third generation respectively. 
 
 Figure 2.1.1.1 Simple Feedback Model  
 
 
Source: Di et al, 2008, 86. 
 
These intergenerational transfers may involve various forms. As summarized 
by Guo (2008, 99-100), there are both tangible transfers such as financial support 
as well as all kinds of intangible transfers like emotional communication and 
mutual help regarding ritual issues3.  
Among all these transfers, Fei (1983, 9) described one simplified classical 
feedback model. According to his generalization, the model runs as follows. 
Normally the mother is about 40 years old when the adult child (always the son) 
gets married, the young couple will stay with their parents and the mother will 
quit her previous work outside the family and put all her efforts to doing 
household duty as well as taking the responsibility of looking after the new-born 
babies (her grandchildren). In this case, since the mother will not have any income 
from outside the family, the young couple will pay for her living cost. As for the 
father, normally he can work and afford himself until 60 years old and after that, 
both he and the mother will depend on their adult children. At that time, the young 
couples are just about to finish their duty on raising their own children and 
immediately they face the burden of taking care of their aging parents. As 
mentioned by many scholars (Guo, 2008, 101; Fei, 1983, 8; Chen, 1998), the 
process of mutual support runs in such a long-term that it may involve one’s 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
3 The most common example is that parents will help children to manage their wedding and the children will 
help their parents arrange their funerals.  
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whole life. However, based on this simplified feedback model, at least one 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a) can be generated in terms of a relatively short period.  
Moreover, patrilineality is another fundamental concept in the classical 
feedback model described by Fei (1983). As he pointed out in his book (Fei, 1998, 
240-246) unilateral descent is a social arrangement that simplifies the process of 
descending. In China, this arrangement is reflected as patrilineality. In this context, 
a women’s life is divided into two phases. During the first phase she is 
subordinated to her father while when it comes to the second phase after she gets 
married she is dependent on her husband. (Fei, 1998: 198) And therefore, Fei 
asserted that more precisely, parents are actually raising sons rather than children 
so that they can be looked after when they are old. (Fei, 1983, 9) Following figure 
2.1.1.2 presents the feedback model with patrilineality. F1, F2 and F3 represent the 
males in the first, second and third generation and E1, E2 and E3 indicate females 
correspondently. 
 
Figure 2.1.1.2 Feedback Model with Patrilineality 
 
 
 
 
Source: Di et al, 2008, 86. 
 
However, many scholars have noticed that in contemporary China, the 
connection is becoming increasingly stronger between daughter and their own 
parents even after the daughter has got married. (Zhang, 2003; Yan, 2006; Jin, 
2000, 370-371；Xie & Zhu, 2009) In other words, various forms of transfers are 
now also taking place between the parents and their already married daughters, 
which seems to be just against the traditional patrilineality.  
As for this change, different scholars have given different explanations. Some 
argue that the newly emerged transfers between daughters and their parents just 
reflect some changes within the patrilinear structure and the fundamental 
patrilineality is still deeply rooted in Chinese society. (Jin, 2000; Ma, 2003) 
Applying two different concepts of “negotiated commitments” and “cumulative 
commitments” raised by Finch (1989: 190-211), Tang, Ma and Shi (2009) further 
pointed out that these two concepts are just depicting two different 
intergenerational relationships between parents to their adult son and parents to 
their adult daughter. Only the negotiated commitments between parents and their 
adult sons are within the scope of patrilinear descent and take a rule of reciprocity. 
The cumulative commitments between parents and their adult daughters are more 
out of gratitude and therefore, it differs greatly from the traditional reciprocal 
feedback model. Other scholars like Judd (1989) and Hu (1995: 104) also 
emphasize this role of gratitude and love in the relationship between daughter and 
parents.  
But there are also other scholars who maintain that the patrilineality that 
centers on the father-son axis has already changed in contemporary China. (Di et 
al, 2013; Yan, 2006) Yan (2006, 95-106) asserts that husband-wife axis within a 
core family is now achieving more importance and the father-son axis is losing its 
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previous status. One important factor that is argued to lead to this change is 
women’s increasing social status. For instance, the research conducted by Di, You 
and Xin (2013) has shown that women are now gaining more power in family and 
they are playing more decisive roles in intergenerational relationships than before. 
Thus, based on all these arguments, the gender of the filial generation is a 
factor of great significance in the feedback model that may influence parents’ 
downward transfers. If the patrilineality is still the mainstream in China, then 
hypothesis 1b can be generated.  
Hypothesis 1a: After the young couple gets married, the amount of financial 
transfers directed upward from the young couple to their parents correlates 
positively to the amount of time transfers directed downward from the parental 
generation4 to their adult children. 
Hypothesis 1b: If the patrilineality is still the mainstream, then parents would 
give more time transfer to their son and daughter-in-law and less time transfer to 
their daughter and son-in-law. 
 
2.1.2 Needs of adult children in contemporary China 
In this section I will move on to the second perspective illustrating the needs of 
adult children in contemporary China. Unlike the first perspective which traces 
the contemporary downward transfers to the traditional classical feedback model, 
this perspective emphasizes that the downward transfers are parents’ responding 
to the needs of their adult children. (Bai & Chen, 2012; Tao, 2011) Specifically, 
dual-earner families (the families of the second generation), particularly those 
with young children (the third generation) are illustrated to need special help from 
the parental generation (the first generation). 
First of all, much more women are now participating in the labour market and 
dual bread-earner family has become the mainstream in contemporary China. 
Statistics show that the number of women employed in the labour market has 
grown from 291 million in 1990 to 337 million in 2003, accounting for 44.8% of 
all employed people. 5 Lin (2011) noticed that most of the “post-80s” couples 
(couples who were born in the 1980s) are dual bread-earner.  
Secondly, in these dual bread-earner families, most women are not willing to 
give up their work for sparing time to take care of babies or to do other household 
duties. Scholars have given different explanations on this. Lin (2011) argue that 
the females went out to work not only because of rising financial pressure such as 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4 It is widely acknowledged that in China (even nowadays), female takes the main responsibility for household 
duty. Reflected in the feedback model, in most cases it is mother that is giving time transfers to the adult children. 
Due to the limitation of data used in this research, the first analytical sample cannot prove this point and thus 
only “parents” are mentioned in the hypotheses. However, in the descriptive analysis of the second sample, data 
have shown that healthy mothers give much more time transfers than healthy fathers.   
5  The statistics come from the website of Xinhua: http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-
04/26/content_1440778.htm. 
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high housing price but also due to the females’ being deeply influenced by the 
idea of gender equality. Tao (2011) also agrees with the reason of rising financial 
pressure. Bai and Chen (2012, 60) argue that even the family is rich enough and 
the female can live well without working outside the family, still very few women 
would be willing to quit their job and to be a housewife. According to their 
explanation, this is because that in modern families, the bond to maintain a 
marriage is really fragile. With the value of household duty not being recognized 
by the market or the law, the female would suffer a lot if the marriage breaks up. 
Whatever reason it may be, all scholars agree that in contemporary China, it 
would be very difficult for the female to give up her own job for the family.    
In this context of growing dual bread-earner families, current welfare system 
fails to provide these families with necessary social security for raising young 
children, which has made it necessary for their parents to provide supports. This 
failure can be reflected by the underdevelopment of birth insurance as well as the 
various problems regarding pre-school education and care.  
As for the birth insurance, the very first problem is that only a small number 
of female workers are covered. As mentioned by many scholars, large numbers of 
women living rural area are excluded from this insurance, as well as many 
females involved in informal employments. (Song & Shi, 2009, 57-59) In average, 
only 28% of adult women are covered by this insurance in the whole country with 
great gap among different areas. Rich provinces such as Jiangsu had a rate of 
more than 68% while the lowest rate in Guizhou was less than 1%. Until the end 
of 2006, even among those employed females, the average rate of being covered 
by this birth insurance was still only 55%. (Song & Shi, 2009, 59) All these 
statistics have shown that the covering of birth insurance is very limited and even 
for women employed in the labour market, this insurance is still not necessarily 
available for them. 
Moreover, even with this birth insurance, the welfare women get is still far 
from enough. Wan (2007, 31) notice that the social welfare for women has 
improved a lot and now with birth insurance, women can enjoy paid maternity 
leave of about 90 days, medical care as well as fertility subsidy. But this offers 
really tiny help for women in a dual bread-earner family. The most realistic 
problem that this insurance cannot help with is that someone needs to look after 
the baby after that 90 days’ leave.  
Unfortunately, early childhood education and care (for children from 0 to 6 
years old) in China cannot help solve this problem neither. In urban areas, the 
market reform since the 1980s has pushed pre-school education into an awkward 
status and this has made it not only difficult but also expensive for parents to get 
their children into nursery schools or kindergartens, as illustrated by a number of 
scholars. (Hong & Pang, 2009, 3-4; Liu, 2009, 1-2; Liu & Xu, 2011) Before the 
reform, normally the enterprises and institutions where the young parents worked 
would provide nurseries and kindergartens and this provision was regarded as one 
part of welfare. However, after the reform, most of these nurseries and 
kindergartens have closed. (Liu, 2009,1-2) From then on, large amount of social 
capital has flowed in and nowadays the number of either private nurseries or 
private kindergartens has far surpassed the number of public ones. (Chen, 2009; 
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Chu, 2008) However, this has not brought any convenience for parents. Firstly, as 
many scholars argue, this reform has denied the social security function of early 
childhood education and care that was previously achieved through funding 
offered by social enterprises and institutions. (Hong & Pang, 2009, 3-4; Liu & Xu, 
2011) Secondly, as pre-school education is beyond the nine-year compulsory 
education, very few public expenses are devoted to it, especially when local 
governments are under the pressure to expand compulsory education. (Hong & 
Pang, 2009, 3-4; Liu, 2009, 1-2) In this case, only children who go to public 
nurseries or kindergartens can enjoy previous welfare because public funding only 
flows to public nurseries and kindergartens. But the number of public pre-schools 
is so small that only a tiny fraction of young parents can have the opportunity to 
send their children there. As for those private pre-schools, since they run as 
profitable companies, the expenses are really high. Moreover, as illustrated by 
Hong and Pang (2009, 3-4), the quality of these private pre-schools cannot be 
ensured due to lack of regulation and supervision. 
In rural areas, this problem is even more serious. As Pang                                                        
& Han (2010) point out in their research, with more labours migrating from rural 
areas to urban areas, one significant problem is emerging of the care and 
education for those young children of these migrating people. Nowadays, a large 
amount of these young children are still living in rural areas, away from their 
parents who are working in urban areas. As for these children, nurseries and 
kindergartens are even more difficult to get in than those in urban areas. In Li’s 
(2006, 41) empirical research on one relatively rich county in Fuzhou, only half of 
the interviewees have got pre-schools around where he or she lives.    
Thus, the early childhood care and education is now quite under-developed 
and it is not able to meet the social demands. Until 2009, only 40% of children 
between 3 to 6 have the chance to get in a kindergarten. (Liu, 2009, 1-2) Along 
with this low rate, there is also a serious problem of great gap between different 
areas. Meanwhile, as pointed out by Liu (2009, 2), even in urban areas, the 
resources are allocated with great inequality since good preschool education is 
only available to a very small fraction of children.  
In this context, those dual bread-earner families always face such a problem to 
find someone to take care of the children when both partners are working. In fact, 
when typing “dual bread-earner families” (in Chinese) into Google, the first 
several pages are all about discussions and reports on this problem.  
It is in these circumstances that the parental generation stands out and gives 
their adult children the necessary help that they need. Thus, it can be inferred that 
young couple with children who are between 0 to 6 years old need the parental 
generation’s help most, just as what Tao (2011) has discussed in her research. 
What needs to be pointed out here is that to help raise young children is just one 
of the supports given by the parental generation. Apart from this most significant 
help, the parental generation also gives time transfers to deal with the household 
duty so that the young couple can devote all their efforts to their own work, as 
reflected by Shen’s (2013) research.     
Following two hypotheses can be generated based on previous arguments. 
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Hypothesis 2a: The parental generation tends to give more time transfers to 
their adult children if the two partners of young couple both work outside. 
Hypothesis 2b: In the cases that two partners of young couple both work 
outside the home (dual-worker family), the parental generation tends to give more 
time transfers to the filial generation if the young couple has their own child who 
is between 0 to 6 years old. 
 
2.1.3 Underlying mechanism: rational self-interested or altruistic 
giving 
After introducing previous two perspectives, this section will provide another 
perspective that helps understand what mechanism (rational or altruistic) is 
actually underlying the downward transfers described in previous two 
perspectives. For those who support rational mechanism, downward transfers are 
offered out of considerations for parents themselves’ interest. It is argued that the 
intergenerational interaction is now becoming more self-interest-based due to the 
declining filial piety and increasing individual awareness. While for other scholars 
who are for the altruistic mechanism, acknowledging the fact that traditional piety 
filial is decreasing does not mean that the parents are becoming more rational. 
They assert that influenced by deep-rooted traditional family-oriented culture, 
parents are still always willing to help their adult children and as a corollary, a 
new trend is emerging that resources are now flowing downward from the 
parental generation to the filial generation. Arguments about these two 
mechanisms will be described in details in the following sections, starting from 
the rational mechanism. 
As mentioned before, the very core idea of rational mechanism is that parents 
act on their own interest consideration6. Applying this idea to the first perspective 
of feedback model, the downward transfers are strategic investments made by 
rational parents in order to get return from their adult children. Parents act like 
this because the traditional filial piety is decaying while they still need support 
from adult children to get old-age care. 
The starting point of this argument is the decaying of filial piety, the 
traditional culture that bolsters the classical feedback model. To understand this 
culture backbone, the key is the imperative role of family in old-age care 
throughout Chinese history. This importance of family in old-age care can firstly 
be reflected by the filial piety rooted in Confucian culture as mentioned before. 
Fei (1998, 48-53) has pointed out that in ancient China, the main approach to get 
society organized was a series of common codes of behaviour that were generally 
acknowledged by the society at that time. These codes are not necessarily 
ethically good or courteous; rather sometimes one code may even be cruel from 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
6 Here “interest” is applied to indicate material interest.  
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contemporary values. And according to Fei (1998, 50), these codes were not 
decided by one person like the emperor, instead they were passed on from 
generation to generation due to the effectiveness of these codes. The filial piety is 
just one of these codes. In ancient China, if one contravened this piety, not only 
would he or she be despised by the public, but it was also possible for him or her 
to get death penalty in some extreme cases. (Qu, 1981, 27-49) Even in current 
laws, one can find provisions that stipulate this filial piety. For instance, according 
to the Law on the Rights and Interests of the Elderly that was introduced in 1996, 
the filial generation should provide care through informal approaches for the 
elderly who may have illness.  
Nevertheless, even with these stipulations, many scholars assert that the 
backbone culture of filial piety is decaying in contemporary China. In Chen’s 
study about the elderly’s suicide (2009, 165-166), he has classified four types of 
reasons about why the old-age people committed suicide and 70 out of 128 
suicides are classified as despair suicide. This means that in most of the suicide 
cases, old-age people committed suicide due to their children’s non-respect and 
not caring them at all. And the number of this type suicide has experienced a rapid 
growth from the 1980 to 2008. (Chen, 2009, 167) More importantly, in Chen’s 
surveys, most people living in the neighbourhood said that they could do nothing 
concerning these suicides because they do not have the power to condemn those 
children not caring their parents. This has shown that previous traditional common 
code of behaviour is now losing original restrictions.  
For this decline in filial piety, scholars have given many different explanations. 
For Guo (2008), the main factors that have caused this trend are the economic 
development and more importantly, the intervention of state administrative power 
into the grass roots. Guo argued that several political campaigns since 1949 are 
quite ritual and these campaigns have demolished the traditional codes of 
behaviours like filial piety that based on previous local life patterns. Sui (1989) 
also argued for the great effect on traditional culture of this intervention from the 
monopolistic state power.  
As illustrated by Yan (2006, 261), with this declining of filial piety, individual 
awareness of rights is increasing all the time. This emerging awareness can relate 
to one’s education background as well as one’s age. One quantitative research 
carried out by Yu (2011) has shown that education background is significantly 
related to people’s attitudes concerning the classical feedback model raised by Fei. 
Specifically, the more educated one person is, the less likely he or she will be 
influenced by the traditional culture of filial piety. Wu and Jiang (2008) also 
confirmed this finding in their research based on surveys conducted in Jiangsu 
Province and beyond this they also found age as another significant factor. In 
other words, the younger one person is, or the higher education level he or she 
achieves, the less he or she would agree with the idea that the filial generation 
should take the main responsibility for supporting the parental generation on old-
age care.   
In this context, it is claimed by some scholars that the intergenerational 
transfers are now more likely to base on self-interest, as reflected as reciprocal 
resource exchange rather than a continuation of traditional culture. As illustrated 
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by Nie (2007), individual interest is now becoming the main guidance for 
conducts and behaviours. In Chen’s research (1998), he has pointed out that due 
to the decaying of filial piety, the parental generation has lost their previous status 
in the family and they have to “invest” in their children so that when they get old, 
the children are willing to take care of them in return. This investment is named 
by Chen as some kind of strategy that can be shown in various forms, such as 
providing financial support for their children’s education and marriage, helping 
raising babies and dealing with household duty. And according to his data and 
analysis, a positive relationship has been corroborated between the parents’ 
investment and the return they receive from their children.  
With this logic of emphasizing individual interest, it can be inferred that old-
age people with more independence will have less motivation to depend on their 
children. (Tao, 2011, 16-17) In other words, the main reason for parents to give 
transfers to their children is to expect returns and in this case, if they do not need 
the return, then they would not give transfers to their adult children. Tao (2011, 
16-17) supports this argument and she maintains that those parents with relatively 
high income are always financially independent and thus it is not necessary for 
them to count on the feedback support from their adult children. In both Ye’s 
(2012) and Yu’s (2011) empirical research, this speculation has been corroborated 
since they have showed that people with higher income are less likely to hold the 
idea of traditional feedback model. Thus, income will be one vital factor that may 
affect intergenerational relationship. The higher income they earn, the more 
independent they are, the less necessary for them to make such “investments” to 
give out downward transfers. Only considering individual interest, parents will 
give less if they expect less from their children.  
When applying this rational mechanism to understand the second perspective, 
then parents respond to their children’s needs just because they have no other 
choice and this kind of downward transfers will cause extra burden to them. As 
illustrated by some scholars (Bai & Chen, 2012; Tao, 2011), the mother always 
plays the key role in providing labour/time transfers to the young couple. It is 
argued by these scholars that it is these old-age women’s contributions that are 
supporting those dual bread-earner families. Based on this fact, Tao (2011) points 
out that these transfers would do harm to the welfare7 of the parental generation, 
especially to the mother. 
In contrast to rational mechanism, those who argue for altruistic giving 
illustrate that parents take it as granted that they should devote themselves to 
helping their children. In other words, parents support their adult children due to 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7 The literature is in Chinese and the phrase used here is “福利” (translated as “welfare”). However, this Chinese 
phrase can be applied to refer to happiness as well as material interest. The first character “福” mainly means 
happiness and the second “利” refers to interest. By reading through the context of this literature, it can be told 
that the author argues for the rational mechanism and therefore it can be inferred that not only material interest 
will be harmed but also happiness will be injured. In later analysis, considering that the data provide indicators 
for happiness and material interest is difficult to measure, happiness will be chosen here to indicate “welfare” in 
hypotheses 2c.  
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their “instinct” cultivated by the specific cultural environment of family 
orientation. 
Unlike the reciprocal care described in the rational mechanism, many 
contemporary studies emphasized that in China nowadays, both in rural and urban 
areas, there is a trend for resources to flow downward from the parental 
generation to the filial generation. (Liu, 2005; Kang, 2009; Wei, 2011; Yang, 
2011; Wang, 2011; Wang, 2013) Specifically, Kang (2009) pointed out in urban 
areas, children successfully get material as well as labour benefits from parents 
while parents’ emotional demands are not met perfectly. Wang (2013) looked into 
rural families in which adult children migrated into urban areas and he named the 
intergenerational transfers in these families as “auxiliary model”. In this model 
parents provide financial support for their adult children to purchase housing in 
urban areas as well as preparing dowry, betrothal gifts or bride price for their 
adult children (the second generation) when they get married. It is also very 
common that it is the parental generation that takes the responsibility of bringing 
up their grandchildren (the third generation). Meanwhile, the parental generation 
tries their best to be independent, not adding any extra burden for their adult 
children who are working in the urban areas.  
The subjective attitude of altruistic parenting cultivated by family orientation 
culture is mentioned here to explain the behaviour of parents’ supporting their 
adult children. Rooted in the Confucian orientation, the traditional Chinese culture 
puts great emphasis on the family. As illustrated in the book “The Geography of 
Thought” (Nisbett, 2003, 15-19), a conception of individual rights is foreign to 
Chinese people in ancient times and in their social life, individuals are connected 
“as ropes in a net”. The family is just the most significant net and “the individual 
works not for self-benefits but for the entire family”. For people living these nets, 
family advancement is prior to self-advancement. With this background, Yang 
(2011, 157) maintains that the family orientation culture has led the parents to 
make strict demand on themselves while being quite lenient to their adult children. 
This can be reflected by their every effort to helping their adult children while 
caring little about the return they may get. He (2007, 2) and Li (1993) have also 
discussed this family orientation’s effects on parents’ altruistic transfers to their 
children. They both assert that the various supports given by the parental 
generation are not only out of paternal or maternal love, but also due to great 
influences by the traditional culture. To help children get married and establish his 
or her own family is regarded by parents as the most paramount responsibility. 
And it is worthwhile for parents to sacrifice their own interest to meet the 
demands of their children. Some extreme cases have been discussed in Chen’s 
research about old-age people’s suicides. In this research, he classified one type of 
suicide as “volunteer suicide”, in which case old-age people chose to commit 
suicide for the sake of their children. (Chen, 2008, 164) For instance, some old 
people were seriously ill and they though that if they lived on their children would 
have to take much more burden to take care of them.  
This altruistic mechanism of willingness to help children can also be reflected 
by parents’ generosity towards the decrease in care they received from children. 
Yang (2011, 157) illustrates that underlying the downward flow is the increasing 
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difficulty for the filial generation to care for their aging parents. Wei (2011) 
further elaborates how these difficulties come into being. Based on Guo (1995)’s 
and Wang (2004)’s research about recent changes in Chinese population and 
family patterns, he pointed out that with the emergence of core families it has 
become less convenient for adult children to take care of their aging parents. In 
the past, most adult children (always the son) would live with their parents even 
after they get married and in these expanded families, it is very easy and 
convenient for them to look after their parents. However, nowadays, more and 
more young people live independently after they begin to work or get married and 
thus, it is not as easy as in the past for them to care for their parents. As Yang 
illustrated (2011), with this family-oriented culture, parents always treat their 
children with generosity and thoughtfulness and they are quite tolerant to the 
decrease in care from children, which further strengthens the downward resource 
flow from parental generation to filial generation. 
Applying this altruistic mechanism to interpret the downward transfers, the 
more capability parents hold, the more transfers they will devote to the adult 
children. As for parents with higher income, more financial transfers will be 
offered to their adult children. Similarly, more time transfers will be delivered if 
parents are in better health condition. This is because giving time transfers, mainly 
doing household duty and taking care of family members such as a young 
grandchild, is a labour-costing and time-consuming task. Then parents with better 
health condition will be able to give more time transfers. And based on altruistic 
mechanism, if parents are able to help their children, they are always willing to 
offer these help. 
Based on these rational and altruistic mechanisms, three sets of hypotheses 
(Hypotheses 3a, Hypotheses 3b and Hypotheses 3c) are generated. For each set, 
two competing claims are developed based on these two different mechanisms. 
For parents’ income, claim 3a.1 is generated based on rational mechanism 
because parents with higher income are more independent and they rely less on 
the return offered by their adult children. Claim 3a.2 is established on altruistic 
mechanism since altruistic parenting will lead parents to help their adult children 
more if they are able to do this. Similarly, hypotheses 3b.1 and 3b.2 are generated 
based on rational and altruistic mechanism correspondently. Health condition is 
regarded as another indicator for capability to give transfers and altruistic 
mechanism will argue that better health condition of parents will lead to more 
downward time transfers. Apart from these, another set of hypotheses 3c are built 
based on these two mechanisms. As mentioned before, according to rational 
mechanism, responding to children’s needs will be regarded as extra burden by 
parents and the more they need to help, the heavier the burden is, the more harm 
they have to face. (Hypothesis 3c.1) However, the altruistic mechanism will not 
regard this response as burden and they would even argue that the more parents 
help, the happier they would be. 8 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
8 The analytical sample that is applied to analyse happiness of parents does not include information of whether 
there is third generation or whether the second generation is a dual-worker family (see Table 3.4). In this case, in 
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Hypothesis 3a.1: Based on rational mechanism, parents with higher income 
will give less transfer (time or financial) to their children. 
Hypothesis 3a.2: Based on altruistic mechanism, parents with higher income 
will give more financial transfers to their adult children. 
Hypothesis 3b.1: Based on rational mechanism, parents’ health condition will 
not influence their time transfers given to their adult children.  
Hypothesis 3b.2: Based on altruistic mechanism, parents with better health 
condition will give more time transfers to their adult children.  
Hypothesis 3c.1: Based on rational mechanism, the more time transfers 
parents give, the unhappier9 they will be.   
Hypothesis 3c.2: Based on altruistic mechanism, more time transfers parents 
give will not harm their happiness. In contrast, it is even possible that the more 
time transfers they give, the happier they would be.  
 
2.2 Controls and other considerations 
Finished with the three perspectives provided by previous studies, this section will 
introduce some controls and some other considerations that are important for later 
analyses. First of all, previous studies have shown that regional differences can be 
greatly significant when looking into intergenerational interaction and the 
distinction between rural and urban areas is one of the most important. For 
instance, when analysing three kinds of transfers given by the adult children to 
their parents (namely financial transfers, life care and emotion communication), 
Xia and Ma (1995) found that families from urban areas differ greatly from 
families from rural areas. On one hand, the total financial intergenerational 
interaction in urban area shows a larger number in terms of quantities due to more 
advanced economic development while on the other hand, the adult children in 
rural area plays a more important role in providing living cost for their old-age 
parents. (Xia & Ma, 1995, 13) As they illustrated, different economic 
development as well as other factors may contribute to different intergenerational 
interaction modes and thus, when looking into the downward transfers given by 
parents, the regional factor should also be taken into consideration. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
later analysis for happiness as an outcome, it would be impossible to control these variables. As a complement, I 
control upward transfers (both financial and time transfers) given by adult children to their parents. According to 
rational mechanism what parents care about are mainly cost and benefit. In this way, controlling the benefit, 
there should be a significant relationship between what they pay out (cost: downward transfers) and their 
happiness.  
9 Here happiness is used to indicate “welfare” mentioned before. See footnote 7. Also in order to analyse 
happiness of the parents, a different analytical sample will be used for the set of hypotheses 3c. This would be 
illustrated in details in the section 3.2 Analytical Samples.    
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Age of parents is another important factor that will be controlled when 
analysing the downward transfers. For one reason, age can give a rough measure 
for parents’ needs, capability and independence. As illustrated by Chen (1998, 
139), the needs of parents or in other words, their lack of independence will 
influence the transfers among different generations and apart from health 
condition or income level, age is also an important measure to indicate this level 
of independence. In this research, this level of dependence can be regarded as 
“need to invest” for the rational mechanism and for altruistic mechanism, it stands 
for capability to help adult children. Another reason to control age is that data 
used in this research do not involve complete information about whether parents 
are both retired or not. Considering available time would also influence parents’ 
capability to offer time transfers, age is used here as a rough measurement for 
time that parents have.  
Another consideration here is about whether the first generation and the 
second generation live together and how convenient it is for parents to reach 
where their adult children live. This is also an important factor that will influence 
parents’ capability to offer transfers (especially time transfers) as well as the 
difficulty for parents to receive returns (especially time transfers) from their adult 
children. However, in the first analytical sample that will be analysed in this 
research, only 16 out of 546 cases (2.85%) are the first and second generation 
living together. And for the majority of living separately, it is unknown how far 
they live from each other and how difficult for them to reach each other. Apart 
from these reason, I exclude the factor of cohabitation in this research considering 
that cohabitation can be understood both as a reason and as a result. One can say 
that cohabitation has made it more convenient for the parents to provide transfers. 
However, it also makes sense to argue that cohabitation is a decision made by 
parents because parents want to provide transfers to their adult children. 
Nevertheless, whether the two generations live together is still of great importance 
and it needs to be discussed in future studies. 
 
2.3 Aim of this research 
After introducing three main perspectives and some controls based on previous 
research, this final part of the theoretical section would illustrate the aim of this 
research and what contribution this research plans to make to current studies. In 
general, this research aims to combine perspectives offered by previous research 
based on a database collected from a nation-wide empirical study so that a more 
general and comprehensive understanding can be achieved to figure out the 
motivation underlying these downward transfers. Specifically, the 
aims/contributions of this research are listed as follows. 
First of all, this research will try to look into the intergenerational relationship 
from the parents’ (the first generation) perspective. From the literature review, 
one can see that most focus has been given to old-age care and how this is 
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affected by changes in feedback model. In other words, most current discussions 
are about how filial generation treats their aging parents after they become 
independent adults. Therefore, a discussion about why parents are giving transfers 
to their adult children from the perspective of the parental generation would help 
give a more comprehensive understanding of intergenerational relationship.  
Secondly, most previous research are based on local empirical studies. By 
using a database collected from a nation-wide study, one can see whether or not 
the research conclusions got by local empirical study can be applied to the overall 
case all around China. 
In addition, the most critical aim of this research is to combine these 
perspectives and then try to draw a more general and comprehensive picture about 
what factors are contributing to the downward transfers. What these perspectives 
provide are potential factors that may motivate parents to help their adult children, 
including the return they get from children, the help that their children need, their 
own capability and their willingness to give. And it is probable that one will be 
driven by multiple motives at the same time. What this research aims to do is to 
illustrate these motives in one general picture. Specifically, by testing and 
combining these factors, one can see whether these factors are significant in 
shaping parents’ supporting behaviour for their adult children and how those 
significant factors work to influence the downward transfers.  
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3 Research design 
Equipped with theoretical perspectives that will provide potential answers to the 
research question, the second step of research design is made in this section to 
answer the research question. This research will apply quantitative methods based 
on a database achieved by a nation-wide survey. This database is public and 
available to any one who are interested in. (A process of application is needed.) In 
this section, data source and how analytical samples are selected will be 
introduced first. Descriptive analyses for all variables as well as limitation of the 
data will come after that. Finally, two statistical models that will be applied are 
presented.  
 
3.1 Data source 
The first step of this research design is to get a raw database. The raw data were 
collected by the research project “Chinese General Social Survey” host by the 
National Survey Research Center, Renmin University of China. So far, several 
surveys have been conducted within this project. This research chooses the one 
that is carried out in 2006 because an extra family questionnaire is included in this 
survey. In this extra questionnaire, respondents answer questions regarding 
intergenerational relationship, involving the transfers between different 
generations. 
The survey applied non-probability stratified sampling from 30 provinces and 
regions (municipalities and autonomous regions) all around China. In total 10,151 
effective samples are obtained, including 6,013 from urban area and 4,138 from 
rural area. Among all these effective samples, 3,208 were selected to conduct 
face-to-face interviews to fill in the extra family questionnaire and finally 3,207 
effective samples are achieved. In each of these 3,207 samples, solicited 
information is obtained about the respondent’s individual as family situations. The 
data of these 3,207 samples constitute the raw data source for this research. 
More specifically, the survey collected information from both the parental 
generation and filial generation discussed in this research. In other words, the 
respondent may be a parent (the first generation) who has adult child or an adult 
child (the second generation) whose parents are alive. In these two different cases, 
different information is obtained due to the questions set in the survey. This will 
affect the selection of analytical samples as discussed in the following part.  
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3.2 Analytical samples 
As mentioned before, the raw database provides different information for the 
parental generation and the filial generation discussed in this research. Based on 
this fact, two analytical samples are selected to meet research purposes. In general, 
the first analytical sample will include data from respondents as adult children and 
only those cases are selected where the two couples of both the first and the 
second generation are married and alive. For the second analytical sample, cases 
are chosen from those respondents as parents with adult children but it is not 
ensured whether or not the adult child is married. Following will introduce more 
detailed information about these two analytical samples and why they are selected 
like this. 
The general principle for selecting analytical sample is that this research will 
focus on the tangible transfers given by parents to their married adult children and 
only consider those cases in which parents, the adult children and his or her 
partner are all alive. The adult children have to be currently married since it is 
always the case that once adult children get married, they will be independent and 
have their own family. In this case, it would be meaningful to look into why their 
parents still give downward transfers. Otherwise, it would be really difficult to set 
a standard to justify whether or not the adult children are independent or not. 
Apart from this, this research will only look into cases in which both the parents 
and the young couple of adult children are all alive. Considering that the situation 
of widow or divorce will probably influence the level of dependency between the 
first and second generation, this restriction on research objectives will remove this 
potential influence that may affect the downward transfers.  
The first analytical sample is selected based on this general principle. Due to 
the fact that based on the survey one cannot know whether the respondent’s adult 
child is married or not (if he or she has adult child), only data from the adult child 
are applied in this first analytical sample. Thus, to further select this analytical 
sample, respondents who does not meet any one of the following requirements 
have been dropped: the respondent must be married and his or her partner is alive; 
additionally, the respondent’s parents are also married and alive; and finally, all 
necessary answers that are applied to indicate dependent or independent variables 
are not missing/not applicable. At last, 562 effective cases/respondents are 
reserved to constitute this first analytical sample.  
For the second analytical sample, there should be indicators for parents’ 
happiness. Since only the respondent’s happiness is asked during the survey, data 
from the parent are analysed in this second analytical sample. Therefore, to get 
this analytical sample, cases that do not meet any one of the following 
requirements have been dropped: the respondent must be married and his or her 
partner is alive; additionally, the respondent’s answers are not missing/not 
applicable for the questions of “Do you give your adult child time 
transfers/financial transfers” as well as “Do your adult child give you 
financial/time transfers” so that it is ensured the respondent has an adult child; and 
finally, all necessary answers that are applied to indicate dependent or 
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independent variables are not missing/not applicable. All these restrictions result 
in an analytical sample of 1,067 respondents. 
However, there is one limitation here when it comes to the second analytical 
sample: in this sample, it cannot be assured that the adult children are married. As 
mentioned before, when the respondent is a parent, what can be achieved from the 
survey is whether or not he or she has an adult child but the information is missing 
concerning the marital status of this adult child. This is because when asking the 
question “Do you give your adult child time transfers/financial transfers”, there is 
one extra instruction pointing out that the “adult child” in this question refers to 
the one that is the closest to the respondent. Although from other questions, 
information is available regarding the marital status of the respondent’s every 
child, we do not know exactly which child the respondent is referring to when 
answering the question about intergenerational transfers.  
 
3.3 Measures and descriptive analysis 
After achieving two analytical samples as mentioned before, outcome variables 
and explanatory variables are introduced with some descriptive analysis in this 
part. Following will start with outcome variables.  
 
3.3.1 Outcome variables 
Three outcome variables are listed as follows. As analysed before, the first 
analytical sample will be applied to analyse time transfers and financial transfers 
from parents to adult children and the second analytical sample will be used to 
analyse happiness of parent. 
Time Transfers from Parents to Adult Children—are measured with 
frequencies. In the first analytical sample, the respondent is an adult child and he 
or she is asked “In the past year, have your parents helped you with household 
chores or taken care of your babies/other family members?” The respondents can 
choose answer from never, seldom, sometimes, regularly, always and not 
applicable. Since those not applicable cases have been dropped in the analytical 
sample, the answer could only be one of the previous five choices. These choices 
are successively coded from 1 to 5 with “1” referring to the least “never” and “5” 
standing for the most “always”.  
Financial Transfers from Parents to Adult Children—are also measured 
with frequencies. The measurement is quite similar to that of time transfers. As an 
adult child, the respondent is asked “In the past year, have your parents given 
money to help you?” Also the respondent can choose one answer from the six 
choices and since the no applicable cases have been dropped, the answer could 
only be one of the previous five, namely never, seldom, sometimes, regularly and 
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always. The coding is also the same with a range from 1 to 5 and “1” refers to the 
least “never” and “5” stands for the most “always”.  
Nevertheless, this measurement has one notable limitation. It is reasonable to 
measure the time transfers with frequencies but it may be quite problematic to use 
frequencies as a measurement of financial transfers. One can say that with low 
frequency, the total amount can still be very high as long as the amount of each 
time is big enough. Therefore, when analysing financial transfers, an additional 
model will be established based on another way of coding. Specifically, the 
financial transfer will be recoded as a dichotomous variable. If the respondent 
answers “never”, then it would be coded as 0 meaning that the adult children 
receive no financial transfer from parents. All other cases would be recoded as 1 
to show that no matter more or less, the adult child gets some money from the 
parental generation. 
With two different approaches of coding, it is hoped that the data can be made 
fully use of, while at the same time, the data could be analysed and interpreted in 
a more cautious way. With the first coding, one can tell some stories about the 
frequency of financial transfers. With the second coding, accurate analyses can be 
achieved about what determines whether or not parent will give money to help 
their adult children. 
The majority of this research is concerned with these two outcome variables. 
In Table 3.3.1.1 the distributions of these two outcomes are presented.  
 
Table 3.3.1.1 Downward Time, Financial Transfers in the 1st Analytical Sample 
 Time Financial  
5 - Always 2.31 0.71 
4 - Regularly 9.79 5.52 
3 - Sometimes 24.20 22.95 
2 - Seldom 28.47 25.27 
1 - Never 35.23 45.55 
    Total 100.00 100.00 
Note: Numbers are percentages. N = 562. 
 
From Table 3.3.1.1, we can tell that on one hand, no matter more or less, more 
than half of the respondents have received time transfers/financial transfers from 
their parents in the past year. And in comparison, time transfers are more common 
than financial transfers. On the other hand, for both time and financial transfers, 
respondents who receive transfers with the highest frequency only account for a 
small fraction. And the cases with a medium frequency have made up for the 
majority.  
Happiness of the Parent—is measured with different levels ranging from 1 to 
5. The second analytical sample will be applied to analyse since only the 
happiness of the respondent himself or herself is asked in the survey. Specifically, 
the respondent is asked: “In general, how do you feel about your life?” Except for 
missing values, the answer could be: very unhappy, unhappy, so-so, happy or very 
happy. Again a scale from 1 to 5 is used to code these five levels successively 
with 1 referring to very unhappy and 5 referring to very happy. Since the later part 
of this research will be concerned with gender of parents, their time transfers to 
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adult children and happiness, Table 3.3.1.2 presents the distribution of parents’ 
happiness levels by gender difference and Table 3.3.1.3 presents the distribution 
of parents’ offering time transfers by gender difference.  
 
Table 3.3.1.2 Parents’ Happiness by Gender Difference  
(2nd Analytical Sample) 
Note: Numbers are percentages. N = 1,067. 
 
In general, we can see that most respondents are at least not unsatisfied with 
their life. And when we compare female to male, it comes out that gender issue 
does not make much difference. The average level for female is about 3.42 and 
the average for male is 3.47. The p-value of 0.3299 (t-test) shows that different 
genders are not significantly different in terms of happiness.  
 
Table 3.3.1.3 Parents’ Offering Time Transfers by Gender Difference  
(2nd Analytical Sample) 
 Mother Father  Total 
5 - Always 10.19 6.90 8.72 
4-Regularly 24.79 21.97 23.52 
3-Sometimes 19.35 25.73 22.21 
2 - Seldom 24.11 22.18 23.25 
1 - Never  21.56 23.22 22.31 
    Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note: Numbers are percentages. N = 1,067. 
 
In general, it seems that both father and mother offer time transfers to their 
adult children. And comparing all female to all male respondents, the t-test (p = 
0.1716) does show that there is no significant difference between these two 
groups in terms of the time transfers they give. However, when dropping those 
cases where respondents are unhealthy (only keeping cases where health 
condition > 2), it is shown by t-test that there is a statistically significant 
difference between female and male respondents with p = 0.0169 < 0.05. 
Specifically, healthy mothers are providing more time transfers to adult children 
than healthy fathers. This responds to the illustration in footnote 4.  
 
3.3.2 Independent variables 
After outcome variables, explanatory variables are listed as follows. 
 Mother Father Total 
5 - Very happy 6.11 5.86 6.00 
4 - Happy 38.20 41.63 39.74 
3 - So-so 48.05 46.86 47.52 
2 - Unhappy 7.13 4.60 6.00 
1-Very unhappy 0.51 1.05 0.75 
    Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Financial Transfers from Adult Children to Parents—are also measured 
with frequencies, just as the same way of financial transfers from parents to adult 
children. This variable will be applied in both two analytical samples. In the first 
one, this variable will be applied as an explanatory variable for downward 
transfers. As a child, the respondent is asked: “In the past year, have you given 
your parents money?” In the second analytical sample, this variable will be 
applied to control the return parents get from their children. As a parent, the 
respondent is asked: “In the past year, have your adult child given money to you?” 
In both cases, answers includes never, seldom, sometimes, regularly, always and 
not applicable.  
Also two approaches of coding will be applied here considering the limitation 
of using frequencies to measure financial transfers as mentioned before. In one 
approach, the five choices of different frequencies will be coded successively with 
a range from 1 to 5, with “1” referring to the least “never” and “5” standing for 
the most “always”. In the other approach, all cases except “never” will be coded 
as 1, showing that the adult child has given his or her parents some money no 
matter more or less. The cases of “never” will be coded as 0, showing no financial 
transfers from adult children to parents.  
Table 3.3.2.1 presents the distribution of financial transfers from the 
respondent (adult child) to the parent in the first analytical sample, showing that 
most respondents have given their parents financial support in the last year. Table 
3.3.2.1 gives the distribution in the second analytical sample. 
 
Table 3.3.2.1 Upward Financial Transfers in the 1st Analytical Sample 
 Upward Financial Transfers  
5 - Always 2.85 
4 - Regularly 18.15 
3 - Sometimes 38.97 
2 - Seldom 25.27 
1 - Never 14.77 
    Total 100.00 
Note: Numbers are percentages. N = 562. 
 
Table 3.3.2.2 Upward Financial Transfers in the 2nd Analytical Sample 
 Upward Financial Transfers  
5 - Always 2.34 
4 - Regularly 16.78 
3 - Sometimes 29.33 
2 - Seldom 18.84 
1 - Never 32.71 
    Total 100.00 
Note: Numbers are percentages. N = 1067 
 
Time Transfers from Adult Children to Parents—are also measured with 
frequencies, just as the same way of downward time transfers. This variable will 
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be applied in the second analytical sample as another control of the return 
received by parents from their adult children. As a parent, the respondent is asked: 
“In the past year, have your adult children helped you with household chores or 
taken care of other family members?” Answers includes never, seldom, 
sometimes, regularly, always and not applicable. Following 3.3.2.3 shows the 
distribution of this variable. 
 
Table 3.3.2.3 Upward Time Transfers in the 2nd Analytical Sample 
 Upward Time Transfers  
5 - Always 2.34 
4 - Regularly 17.06 
3 - Sometimes 31.77 
2 - Seldom 29.80 
1 - Never 19.03 
    Total 100.00 
Note: Numbers are percentages. N = 1067. 
 
Gender of the Adult Child—is a dummy variable, with female coded 0 and 
male coded 1. Among all the 562 respondents in the first analytical sample, 354 
(62.99%) are female and 208 (37.01%) are male.  
Income of Adult Children (Neglog10)—neglog of the total annual income of 
the respondent and his or her partner in 2005. In the survey, the respondent gives 
an exact number of his or her income in 2005 as well as the income his or her 
partner. This income includes all forms of benefits, such as salaries, insurance and 
interests. By deleting those missing cases, we get the total amount income of the 
young couple (the second generation) by adding up the income of the respondent 
and the partner. Table 3.3.2.4 presents some summary statistics about the original 
income data. One possible limitation here is that last year’s income may be biased 
to stand for the usual income level sometimes. However, since the data about 
intergenerational time transfers and financial transfers are also describing the 
situation last year, it is reasonable to analyse these data together.  
 
Table 3.3.2.4 Income of Adult Children (1st Analytical Sample) 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Income 562 20,816.32 19,701.08 0 230,000 
Note：N: Number of observations; Std. Dev.: Standard deviation. 
 
When transform the original data into logarithm using normal log 
transformation, missing values are generated for those cases with no income. 
However, these cases should be included into analysis because they stand for real 
cases where incomes are zero.11 In this context, neglog12 is applied here as an 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
10 See footnote 12.  
11 According to the design of the questionnaire, respondent can choose not to answer or not know for questions 
regarding income. And these cases have already been dropped when selecting the analytical sample. In addition, 
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alternative for normal log transformation (Nichols & Zimmerman, 2008, 11). 
With neglog, we also assume that it is percentage change in income that matters 
and the skewness is also reduced. In other words, the advantages of applying 
normal log transformation are also realized in this approach.   
Gender of the Parent—is a dummy variable, with female coded 0 and male 
coded 1. Among all the 1067 respondents in the second analytical sample, 589 
(55.20%) are female and 478 (44.80%) are male.  
Age of Father/Mother—is calculated by using 2006 to subtract the birth year 
because the survey was conducted in 2006. This variable will be applied in both 
analytical samples.  
In the first analytical sample, the respondent gives information about the birth 
year of his or her parents. And accordingly, both father’s and mother’s ages can 
be achieved. Table 3.3.2.5 presents some summary statistics for parents’ age in 
the first analytical sample.  
 
Table 3.3.2.5 Age of Parents by Gender Difference in the 1st Analytical Sample 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Father 562 64.89 9.20 44 94 
Mother 562 63.06 8.90 42 92 
Note：N: Number of observations; Std. Dev.: Standard deviation. 
 
In the second analytical sample, data from a parent is analyzed. Therefore, 
parent’s age can be calculated based on the respondent’s birth year. Table 3.3.2.6 
presents summary statistics of parent’s age by gender difference. 
 
Table 3.3.2.6 Age of Parents by Gender Difference in the 2nd Analytical Sample 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Father 478 54.58 7.74 37 70 
Mother 589 52.76 7.98 37 70 
Note：N: Number of observations; Std. Dev.: Standard deviation. 
 
Health Condition of Father/Mother—is measured based on subjective 
evaluation of the respondent. This variable will be applied in both analytical 
samples. 
For the first analytical sample, as an adult child, the respondent gives 
evaluation on his or her parents’ health conditions, choosing from very unhealthy, 
unhealthy, so-so, healthy and very healthy. These five answers are coded with a 
range from 1 to 5, with 1 referring to the worst and 5 referring to the best. Table 
3.3.2.7 provides the distribution of health conditions by gender difference, 
showing that the majority of parents are in good health conditions. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
it is possible to have zero income in reality when the expenditure is positive. It is even possible to have negative 
income for those self-employed ones. (Nichols & Zimmerman, 2008, 4)    
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Table 3.3.2.7 Parents’ Health in the 1st Analytical Sample 
 Mother Father  
5-Very healthy 13.70 14.59 
4 - Healthy 51.78 57.47 
3 - So-so 13.35 10.50 
2- Unhealthy 19.93 16.55 
1-Very Unhealthy 1.25 0.89 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Note: Numbers are percentages. N (mother) = N (father) =562. 
 
In later analysis, age and health conditions would be treated as explanatory 
variables for the same outcome variable, thus it would be necessary to look into 
the potential correlation between them. Correlation test has shown for both mother 
and father, age and health condition are correlated at a significant level with p = 
0.000 < 0.001. However, the absolute value of correlation coefficient is 0.1832 < 
0.5 for mother and 0.2785 < 0.5 for father. Therefore, it is acceptable to put these 
two variables in one model as predictors at the same time. 
For the second analytical sample, the respondent is a parent and he or she 
evaluates the health condition of himself or herself as well as his or her partner. 
The same coding is applied as that in the first analytical sample. Table 3.3.2.8 
provides the distribution of health conditions of respondents and their partners.  
 
Table 3.3.2.8 Parents’ Health in the 2nd Analytical Sample 
 Respondent Partner 
5-Very healthy 15.28 16.03 
4 - Healthy 51.83 56.04 
3 - So-so 12.28 10.03 
2- Unhealthy 17.24 15.93 
1-Very Unhealthy 3.37 1.97 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Note: Numbers are percentages. N (respondent) = N (partner) =1076. 
 
Similarly, correlation test has been carried out between respondent’s age and 
respondent’s health condition. There is a significant correlation (p = 0.000 < 0.001) 
while the absolute value of coefficient is 0.2045 < 0.5.   
Income of Parents (Neglog13) — is measured by the same approach of 
children’s income, using the annual income in 2005. The survey provides the 
income of the respondent, the respondent’s partner and father.  
In the first analytical sample, the respondent reports his father’s annual 
income in 2005. However, mother’s income is not available. Therefore, father’s 
income will be applied to stand for parents’ income. Table 3.3.2.9 shows a 
summary description of the original data for father’s income.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
13 See footnote 12. 
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Table 3.3.2.9 Father’s Income in the 1st Analytical Sample 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Father 562 7,478.897 9,790.536 0 120,000 
Note：N: Number of observations; Std. Dev.: Standard deviation. 
 
In the second analytical sample, the respondent is a parent and thus, both the 
respondent and his or her partner’s incomes are available. Table 3.3.2.10 shows 
summary statistics of these two. 
 
Table 3.3.2.10 Parents’ Income in the 2nd Analytical Sample 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Respondent 1067 7216.12 8648.76 0 10,000 
Partner 1067 8775.32 61673.12 0 2,000,000 
Note：N: Number of observations; Std. Dev.: Standard deviation. 
 
Whether or not Adult Children are Dual-worker Family — is a 
dichotomous variable with dual-worker family coded 1 and not dual-worker 
family coded 0. In the first analytical sample, the respondent is the adult child and 
he or she reports the vocation of himself or herself as well as that of his or her 
partner. Based on such information, if both of them work outside the family, then 
they are dual-worker families. Among the 526 cases, 382 (67.97%) are dual-
earner families.   
Whether or not there is a Young Grandchild (the third generation) — is a 
dichotomous variable with having a young grandchild (between 0-6 years old) 
coded 1 otherwise coded 0. Among all the 526 cases in the first analytical sample, 
171 (30.43%) respondents (adult child, the second generation) have their own 
young child who is between 0 to 6 years.   
Rural or Urban Area— is a dummy variable with rural area coded 1 and 
urban area coded 0. This describes the region where the respondent resides. In the 
first analytical sample, 411 (73.13%) respondents live in urban area and 151 
(26.87%) reside in rural area. In the second analytical sample, 666 (62.42%) 
respondents live in urban area and 401 (37.58%) reside in rural area. 
 
3.4 Limitation with the data 
In order to summarize previous sections about analytical samples, also to start the 
following discussion of data limitation, table 3.4 is presented to get an overview 
of what information are available in each analytical sample.  
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Table 3.4 Information Contained in Each Analytical Sample 
Information 1st Sample 2nd Sample 
Downward transfers in the past year 
(Time & Financial) Y Y 
Upward transfers in the past year  
(Time & Financial) Y Y 
Adult child’s marital status  Y N 
Parent’s marital status Y Y 
Happiness of parent N Y 
Adult child is in a dual-worker family or 
not  Y N 
Whether there is young third generation Y N 
Parents’ health conditions Y Y 
Parents’ income (in 2005) Only father’s income Y 
Adult children’s income (in 2005) Y N 
Gender of adult child Y N 
Gender of parent N Y 
Age of parents Y Y 
Rural or urban area (respondent) Y Y 
Note: Y: Information is available. N: Information is not available.  
 
This data has limitations. Most notably, as Table 3.4 shows, the data cannot 
provide complete information about the first and second generations. Even though 
two analytical samples are selected to look into different outcome variables, some 
information is still missing with each analytical sample. In the first one mother’s 
income is not available and for the second one, the marital status of the adult child 
cannot be controlled, neither do whether there is young third generation and 
whether the second generation is a dual-worker family.  
Secondly, lots of information provided by the data are measured based on 
subjective evaluation. This may bring some bias when comparing answers given 
by different respondents with different understandings. For instance, the 
frequency of “very often” may have different meanings for different respondents. 
This will be mentioned again in later analysis in section 6 Limitation and Future 
Analysis.  
Another limitation lies in the measurement of financial transfers. It is possible 
that frequencies may bring bias when indicating the amount of financial transfers. 
Thus two different coding approaches are applied as illustrated before. 
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Short-term indicators for intergenerational transfers (the past year) as well as 
for income (in 2005) may also bring some problem. As an indicator of financial 
capability, income only in one year may bring some bias. It is possible that 
although someone’s income is really low in that certain year, he or she has a large 
deposit or owns some resources that have a very promising profitable future. 
However, these short-term indicators may have an advantage in capturing the 
simple feedback model described by Xiaotong Fei. And since the indicators for 
intergenerational transfers and income both base on the year of 2005, it is 
reasonable to assume some interaction between them and to put them in the same 
model.  
Finally, the variable of region only reflects the residence of the respondent, 
which may miss some meaningful information. There may be some cases that the 
two generations live in different areas. For instance, it is quite possible that the 
first generation resides in the rural area while the second generation lives in urban 
area. This difference in residence between two generations may also exert some 
effect on intergenerational transfers. 
3.5 Statistical model for multivariate analysis 
With theoretical basis as well as data source prepared, now it is time to search for 
suitable statistical models. Considering the characteristics of outcome variables, 
ordinal logistic regression (OLR) and binary logistic regression (BLR) will be 
applied in this research for multivariate analysis. OLR belongs to multi-nominal 
logistic regression and both OLR and BLR are nonlinear regression models 
estimated through maximum likelihood. In later discussion, these two models will 
be introduced in more details.  
 
3.5.1 Ordinal logistic regression 
 
Ordinal logistic regression is applied here because the three response variables in 
this research are all measured on an ordinal scale. Each outcome variable has five 
categories that can be ordered in a meaningful sequence.  
The model can be specified as follows: ln 𝑃𝑟 𝑌! ≤ 𝑚𝑃𝑟 𝑌! > 𝑚 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!!!!! 𝑥! 
In this model, 𝑌!  stands for three dependent variables with sequential 
categories m=1 – 5. Specifically, k could be 1 (time transfers from parents to 
children), 2 (financial transfers from parents to children with the first coding 
approach) and 3 (happiness of the parent). 𝑥!,  𝑥!, …  𝑥! are explanatory variables 
and 𝛽! is the effect parameter for 𝑥!.  𝛽! is a constant term and this constant would 
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be different if m changes. Hence, 𝛽! captures the expected change in the ordered 
log-odds scale of the response variable if the respective independent variable 𝑥! 
increases one unit, holding all other variables constant.  
The proportional odds assumption is underlying this OLR model. Specifically, 
in this model, we can see that for a certain k (for each outcome variable), although 
the constant term will change, the effect parameter/coefficient for the same 
independent variable will stay the same. In other words, for a certain 𝑥!, the 𝛽! 
will be the same when m gets different values. This means that the OLR assumes 
that the relationship is the same between each contiguous level of a certain 
outcome variable and it is this assumption that allows us to use one equation to 
describe the relationship among all levels. (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group) 
To check whether this assumption is violated, test of parallel items is 
conducted for every model. Specifically, in the program of Stata, Brant’s test is 
applied to carry out this test of parallel items. In some cases, this assumption is 
violated in the beginning and some adjustments have been made (detailed 
information will be provided in later section 4 Results and Interpretation). For all 
models that are presented later in this analysis, the Brant’s test has shown 
insignificant chi-square value (p < 0.05), which means that this assumption is met. 
The results of the Brant’s test for all presented models can be found in the 
appendix.  
 
3.5.2 Binary logistic regression 
Regarding the response variable of financial transfers from parents to adult 
children, two coding approaches will be applied as analysed before. In the second 
approach, the financial transfer is measured as a dichotomous variable. Thus, to 
analyse this dichotomous variable, binary logistic regression will be applied.  
The model can be specified as:  
 ln 𝑃𝑟 𝑌 = 11− 𝑃𝑟 𝑌 = 1 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!!!!! 𝑥! 
Correspondently,  𝑃𝑟(𝑌 = 1) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽! + 𝛽!!!!! 𝑥!)1+ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽! + 𝛽!!!!! 𝑥!) 
In this model, 𝑃𝑟  (𝑌 = 1) is the probability that the outcome is 1, which 
indicating that the adult children has received some financial transfers from 
parents no matter more or less. 𝑥!,  𝑥!, …  𝑥! are explanatory variables and 𝛽! is 
the effect parameter for 𝑥!. 𝛽! is a constant term. From 𝛽! we can know how 𝑥! 
influences the outcome variable. 
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4 Results and interpretation 
With prepared hypotheses, selected analytical sample and chosen statistical 
models, it is time to run the model and look into the results. For every response 
variable, all related explanatory variables are integrated into several models with 
the expectation that better explanation could be attained. In order to give a more 
coherent understanding, this section will be divided into three parts and in each 
part discussion will orient on one outcome variable. In later section 5 Discussion, 
these results achieved for every outcome variable will be analysed to respond to 
the three perspectives discussed in the theoretical section. 
In following three parts, one table would be presented for each part, 
integrating results for all models explaining a certain outcome variable. For all the 
three tables presented later, four indicators for models14 are offered. The main 
entries of logit coefficients (B) for every variable are reported with correspondent 
standard errors (SE) in the parentheses. Odds ratios will not be reported in these 
tables in order to keep the tables clean and concise but they will be mentioned and 
interpreted in analysis so that more straightforward understanding can be caught.15 
Following I will start with the part for downward time transfers, followed by 
discussion for downward financial transfers and parents’ happiness.   
 
4.1 Empirical findings of determinants for downward 
time transfers 
One main model and four additional models are established to analyse time 
transfers given by parents to adult children. Predictors mainly involve three 
groups based on three perspectives discussed in the theoretical part. Financial 
transfers from adult children to parents and gender of adult children are the first 
group. To clarify, for financial transfers, the first coding approach is applied here 
with 5 levels. Health conditions of parents form the second group of predictors. 
And the third group of predictors is constituted of whether the adult children are 
dual-worker family and whether they have their own child (the third generation). 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
14 There four indicators involve: LR chi2, Prob>chi2, Pseudo R2 and Log likelihood.  
15 Although coefficients and odds ratios hold actually the same meaning, many scholars chose to include both in 
their reports’ tables (Wu &Jiang, 2008, 64; Ye, 2012, 26; Yu, 2011, 77). However, in this research, due to the 
fact that results of several models are reported in one table, I choose to only to report coefficients, just as some 
other scholar have done in their research. (Chen, 1998, 145-146; Di et al, 2013, 91)   
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Parents’ age and income, adult children’s income and the residence region are 
controlled. Table 4.1 presents the results of all the five models to explain 
downward time transfers. 
For the first model, all cases in the first analytical sample are involved. 
Generally, the model summary shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected that 
all coefficients in this model are zero. When looking into the predictors, two of 
them have shown statistically significant effect on the response variable, namely 
financial transfers parents received from adult children and the dichotomous 
variable indicating whether or not there is a third generation between 0 to 6 years 
old. Specifically, if financial transfers parents receive increases one level, time 
transfers given by parents are expected to grow by 0.46 in the ordered log-odds 
scale16 holding all other variables constant. If one explains with odds ratio, then 
with one level increase in financial transfers offered by adult children, the odds of 
parents providing more than m (m can be any value ranging from 1 to 5) level 
time transfers versus less or equal to m level are 1.59 times greater, with all other 
variables in this model holding the constant. This result has confirmed hypothesis 
1a. Similarly, if one family changing from having no third generation to getting 
one grandchild between 0 to 6 years old, time transfers given by parents are going 
to increase by 0.43 in the ordered log-odds scale keeping all other variables the 
same. Interpretation with odds ration would be that if one grandchild between 0 to 
6 years old joins a family without third generation, the odds would be 1.54 times 
greater of parents providing more than m (m can be any value ranging from 1 to 5) 
level time transfers versus less or equal to m level, when holding all other 
variables in this model constant.  
For other predictors in this model, it seems that they are not significant when 
explaining the outcome variable. Hypothesis 1b is rejected here since there is no 
significant relationship between gender of adult child and downward transfers. 
However, one consideration must be taken into account that when one partner is 
not healthy, the other one would have to take care of him or her and then the 
capability to offer help to adult children will be limited. In order to control this 
influence on parents’ capability, model 1.2 and model 1.3 are established to 
further look into the second group of predictors indicating parents’ health 
conditions.  
Model 1.2 is established to look into cases where father is not unhealthy and 
Model 1.3 drops cases where mother is unhealthy. Specifically, when saying 
father/mother is not unhealthy, I refer to cases where the variable is less than 3 
because 2 stands for unhealthy and 1 refers to very unhealthy. Thus, in model 1.2 
cases are dropped if father’s health condition is coded less 3 and similarly, cases 
with mother’s health condition coded less than 3 are deleted in model 1.3. In 
addition, in model 1.2 father’s health condition is excluded from explanatory 
variables since fathers are considered as not unhealthy in all cases. Likewise, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
16 Ordered log-odds scale refers to outcome of ln !" !!!!!" !!!!  in the OLR model.  
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mother’s health condition is not an independent variable in model 1.3 because in 
all cases included in this model, mother is regard to be not unhealthy.  
Generally, both two models fit significantly better than an empty model as a 
whole. And the two significant variables in model 1 still show significant effect in 
these two models. Apart from all these, new significant findings appear with 
regards to parents’ health conditions and these findings have confirmed 
hypothesis 3b.2 based on altruistic mechanism and hypothesis 3b.1 based on 
rational mechanism is rejected. In model 2, mother’s health shows a statistically 
significant effect on time transfers given by parents. When father is not unhealthy, 
with mother’s health condition improves by one level, time transfers offered by 
parents are expected to show an increase by 0.20 in the ordered log-odds scale 
holding other variables constant. Or one can say that, when father is not unhealthy, 
the odds of parents providing more than m (1 to 5) level time transfers versus less 
or equal to m level time transfers are 1.22 times greater if mother’s health 
condition is improved by one level and all other variables stay the same. Similarly, 
father’s health condition presents a statistically significant effect on predicting the 
outcome variable in model 3. If father’s health condition changes to one level 
higher, then the ordered log-odds scale of the outcome variable is expected to 
grow 0.42 with all other variables are held the same. In other words, the 
probability increases 0.52 times that parents provide more time transfers to their 
adult children with other variables constant. Among control variables in these two 
models, adult children’s income and regional factor have shown significant effect 
in both two models. For the first one, it may be interpreted as when adult children 
have higher income, they are probable to be busier and parents tend to give more 
time transfers. For the second one, parents in rural area tend to give more time 
transfers.  
Model 1.4 is established in order to further check the influence of a dual-
worker family. In model 1, it seems that it does not matter much no matter or not 
the second generation is a dual-worker family. However, based on the theoretical 
section, it is possible that the variable indicating whether or not having a young 
grandchild may play as a moderator here when checking the influence of whether 
a dual-worker family or not. Specifically, it is possible that only in the case of 
having a young grandchild, whether a dual-worker family will show some effect 
on predicting the time transfers giving by parents. Therefore, this model 1.4 is 
built in which cases are reserved only when there is a young grandchild (the 
respective variable is coded 1). However, the results have shown that still there is 
no significant relationship between whether or not the second generation is a dual-
worker family and the time transfers given by parents. Moreover, the whole model 
has lost its original significance in predicting the outcome variable. As a result, 
hypothesis 2a can be rejected.  
The final Model 1.5 is built by reserving cases with the second generation as 
being dual-worker families. The intention of this model is to test exactly 
hypothesis 2b to see whether having a third generation will lead to more 
downward time transfers in a dual-worker family. The results show that whether 
or not having a third generation is not significant in this model. Thus, hypothesis 
2b is rejected based on this information.  
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Table 4.1 OLR Results for Predicting Downward Time Transfers 
Variable Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 Model 1.5 
Upward financial transfers 0.46*** 
(0.08) 
0.36***  
(0.09) 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
0.39** 
(0.16) 
0.39*** 
(0.10) 
Gender of adult child 0.21 
(0.16) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
0.13 
(0.19) 
0.06 
(0.31) 
0.23 
(0.20) 
Father’s health  0.19 
(0.12) 
Controlled 
                  >2 
0.42** 
(0.13) 
0.03 
0.23 
0.08 
(0.15) 
Mother’s health -0.03 
(0.18) 
0.20* 
(0.10) 
Controlled 
                     >2 
0.12 
0.20 
0.12 
(0.13) 
Have a young grandchild or not 0.43** 
(0.18) 
0.47** 
(0.20) 
0.45** 
(0.21) 
Controlled 
                         =1 
0.35 
(0.22) 
Dual-worker family or not 0.07 
(0.18) 
0.008 
(0.20) 
0.13 
(0.21) 
-0.11 
0.32 
Controlled 
                        =1 
Father’s age -0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
0.04 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Mother’s age -0.0003 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Father’s income  0.04 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.06)  
0.08 
(0.07) 
0.006 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
Adult children’s income 0.09 
(0.07) 
0.18** 
(0.09)  
0.18** 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
Rural or urban 0.19 
(0.07) 
0.44* 
(0.24) 
0.48** 
(0.24) 
0.22 
(0.34) 
-0.01 
(0.25) 
N 562 464 443 171 382 
LR chi2 59.12 43.20 59.17 10.95 32.73 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.36 0.0003 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 
Log likelihood -747.77 -626.33 -587.22 -247.68 -515.63 
Note: For each variable in a certain model, coefficient (B) is reported with standard error (SE) in the parenthesis.    
          *: p < 0.1; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.001. 
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To summarize for this section focused on downward time transfers, all five 
models have shown the significance of upward financial transfers. Parents’ health 
condition and the existence of a young third generation have shown significance 
in some models. It is interesting, however, that the significant effect of a young 
child generation only exists when all cases are included. What can be interpreted 
from this, what does this mean for the needs-based theory and how all these 
results can be integrated to explain the downward time transfers will be analysed 
later in the discussion part.     
 
4.2 Empirical findings of determinants for downward 
financial transfers 
Two models are built in this part to analyse downward financial transfers. In the 
first one, the outcome of financial transfers are being analysed in terms of 
frequency while in the second model, financial transfers from parents to adult 
children are regarded as a dichotomous variable. The two different coding 
approaches have been discussed in the section 3.2.  
According to previous studies, the main predictor in these two models is 
father’s income. However, some other potential predictors are also added in this 
model, including whether or not there is a young grand child and whether or not 
the second generation is a dual-worker family. The consideration here is that 
according to the third perspective discussed before, parents give more time 
transfers to adult children if there is a young grandchild. Then it is also possible 
that with more time transfers, parents will give more financial transfers to help 
raise the young grandchild.  
As for control variables, financial transfers from children to parents, parents’ 
age and health conditions, children’s income as well as the residence area are 
involved.  
At the first stage, the outcome variable with five levels is put into this model. 
However, the result of Brant test shows that this model violates the parallel 
regression assumption. According to this result, some adjustments are carried out. 
First of all, the original five levels of financial transfers are combined to three 
levels. Specifically, the original levels of 5 (always) and 4 (regularly) are 
combined and recoded as 3; original level 3 (sometimes) and 2 (seldom) are 
recoded together as 2; and “never” still keeps the previous coding of 1. After 
applying the new outcome variable of these three levels, Brant test still shows that 
the assumption is violated. According to the result, the problem mainly lies in the 
variable of mother’s age. Thus, a new variable is generated through squaring the 
original mother’s age. After this, Brant test shows that the assumption is not 
violated and the ordered logistic regression can be applied to run this model. The 
result of this model is presented in Table 4.2, combined with the results of Model 
2.2. 
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The model as a whole is significant and more importantly, there are four 
independent variables that are statistically significant when predicting financial 
transfers given by parents. The first one is father’s income. With one unit increase 
in father’s income, the frequency for parents to give financial transfers is expected 
to grow by 0.29 in the ordered log-odds scale when holding all other variables 
constant. Consequently, hypothesis 3a.1 is rejected and 3a.2 is confirmed. The 
second significant variable is whether or not there is young grandchild between 0 
to 6 years old. It is shown that if the adult children get a young child themselves, 
the frequency of receiving financial transfers from their parents is expected to 
increase by 0.35 in the ordered log-odds scale holding all other variables the same. 
In other words, the probability of getting more frequent financial transfers from 
parents will increase by 0.42 times if the family gets a young grandchild. 
 
Table 4.2 Results for Predicting Downward Financial Transfers 
Variable Model 2.1  (5 levels) 
Model 2.2 
(2 levels) 
Father’s income 0.29***  
(0.07) 
0.30*** 
(0.07) 
Gender of adult child -0.08 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(0.19) 
Have a young grandchild or not 0.35* 
(0.21)  
0.33 
(0.21) 
Dual-worker family or not -0.22 
(0.20) 
-0.24 
(0.21) 
Upward financial transfers 
(3 levels) 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
 
  
Upward financial transfers 
(2 levels) 
 0.56** 
(0.26) 
Father’s age -0.06* 
(0.03) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
Mother’s age  0.04 
(0.03) 
Mother’s age (squared) 0.0003 
(0.00) 
 
Father’s health 0.09 
(0.14)  
0.12 
(0.15) 
Mother’s health 0.05 
(0.13)  
0.07 
(0.13) 
Adult child’s income 0.03 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
Rural or urban -0.33 
(0.23) 
-0.39 
(0.24) 
N 562 562 
LR chi2 66.63 65.82 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.09 
Log likelihood -462.81 -354.41 
Note: For each variable in a certain model, coefficient (B) is reported with standard error 
(SE) in the parenthesis.   *: p < 0.1; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Among the control variables, upward financial transfers from children to 
parents and father’s age also show significant relationship with downward 
financial transfers from parents to adult children. Specifically, downward 
financial transfers are expected to grow with more frequent upward financial 
transfers if all other variables are held constant. This may be explained by the 
culture of “courtesy demands reciprocity” in China. As for father’s age, 
downward transfers given by parents are expected to decrease in terms of 
frequency with father getting older, holding all other variables the same.  
In Model 2.2, the outcome variable indicating downward financial transfers 
are coded as a dichotomous variable. 1 shows that parents have offered some 
financial transfers in the past year and 0 refers to no downward financial transfers 
at all. As one control variable, upward financial transfers from children to parents 
are also applied as a dichotomous variable in the same way.  
Generally the model is statistically significant. Compared to previous model, 
father’s income is still significant. With one unit increase in father’s income, the 
probability for one adult child to get some financial transfers from parents is 1.35 
times greater. However, in this model, whether or not there is a young grandchild 
is not significant. As for control variables, father’s age and upward financial 
transfers from adult children to parents, also shows a statistically significance 
when predicting the outcome variable, just as the same with the previous model.  
To conclude, father’s income has presented a significant impact on downward 
transfers. And how this impact realizes will be a useful tool to tell which 
mechanism discussed in the third perspective is actually taking the main role. The 
significance exhibited by the existence of a young grandchild may also help 
answer this question to some extent.  
 
4.3 Empirical findings of determinants for parents’ 
happiness 
The second analytical sample is applied to run these two models to analyse 
parents’ happiness, in which the respondent is a parent with adult child. 
Respondent’s own evaluation on happiness with 5 levels is the outcome variable. 
The main predictors here involve transfers given by parents. Both time transfers 
and financial transfers are included here. As for control variables, not only the 
respondent’s gender, age, and residence area are included, but also the health 
condition and income of the respondent and his or her partner are involved into 
this model. On top of this, upward transfers are also controlled in these two 
models in order to indicate the return parents get from their children.  
The first model 3.1 deals with all respondents while the second model 3.2 only 
analyses female respondents (mothers) considering that mothers are argued to take 
the main responsibility for offering time transfers to adult children and their 
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welfare will burden more loss. When running the second model at the first time, 
Brant test shows that the parallel assumption is violated and the main problem 
exists with the variable of the respondent’s health condition. Therefore, some 
adjustments are carried out. For health condition of the respondent, the original 
five levels are changed to 3 levels instead. Previous 1(very unhealthy) and 2 
(unhealthy) are now recoded as 1; previous 3 (so-so) is now recoded as 2; original 
4 (healthy) and 5 (very healthy) are now recoded as 3. After this the assumption is 
met, as shown by Brant test results.  
Results for these two models are presented together in Table 4.3. It is shown 
that neither downward time transfers nor downward financial transfers have any 
significant relationship with parents’ happiness. As for control variables, those 
significant ones include the health condition as well as the income of the 
respondent and the partner. Parents are happier if they or their partner are 
healthier or earn higher income.   
 
Table 4.3 Results for Predicting Parents’ Happiness 
Variable Model 3.1  (All parents) 
Model 3.2 
(Mothers) 
Downward time transfers -0.002  
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
Downward financial transfers 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
Respondent’s health 
(5 levels) 
0.20** 
(0.07) 
 
 
Respondent’s health  
(3 levels) 
 -0.05 
(0.11)) 
Partner’s health 0.17** 
(0.07) 
0.4*** 
(0.10)  
Respondent’s income 0.09*** 
(0.02)  
0.09** 
(0.03) 
Partner’s income 0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Gender of respondent 0.07 
(0.13) 
Controlled 
                    = 0 
Age of respondent 0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Upward time transfers 0.07 
(0.06)  
-0.01 
(0.09) 
Upward financial transfers 0.06 
(0.06)  
0.04 
(0.08) 
Rural or urban 0.001 
(0.13) 
-0.27 
(0.18) 
N 1067 589 
LR chi2 57.04 42.67 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.03 
Log likelihood -1139.34 -629.99 
Note: For each variable in a certain model, coefficient (B) is reported with standard error 
(SE) in the parenthesis.   *: p < 0.1; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.001. 
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In this last part for analysing parents’ happiness, it seems that theoretical 
section discussed previously has not provided us with strong arguments. However, 
not significant results can at least help to reject hypothesis 3c.1. Although parents 
are not significantly happier when devoting more to their adult child, they are also 
not unhappier about this. Later discussion will go further about this by combining 
previous results. 
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5 Discussion 
Finished with exhibition of empirical findings, it is time to interpret and 
understand these results. Through applying these results to looking into the three 
perspectives discussed before, it is hoped that a more comprehensive 
understanding could be achieved to figure out the research question. Also this 
discussion will raise some concerns regarding the data limitations discussed 
before and talk about how these limitations may confine the interpretation of the 
results. 
For the first perspective about classical feedback model, results have shown 
that after the adult child gets married, more often adult children offer financial 
transfers to parents, more time transfers they will receive from parents. However, 
this significant relationship between upward financial transfers and downward 
time transfers does not indicate any causal connection and it cannot be concluded 
that it is these upward financial transfers that are driving the downward time 
transfers. What can be summarized is that the certain social arrangement of that 
feedback model is still alive in China and this intergenerational interaction does 
reflect a reciprocal care result.  
One possible concern here is that both the downward time transfers and 
upward financial transfers were subjective evaluation made by the respondents 
and financial transfers are measured in frequencies rather than absolute values. 
One can argue that the data was collected in 2006 and the questions were set 
about the situation in 2005, in which case the respondents’ memories were quite 
reliable. But still I have to acknowledge that this kind of subjective estimation 
does to some extent influence an exact and actual description of intergenerational 
transfers. However, I would like to argue that this subjective evaluation also holds 
an advantage in capturing “feeling” when the goal is to dig out motivations 
underlying people’s behaviours. Here the respondent is the adult child, and this 
finding illustrates that in their estimation, there is a correlation between how much 
they receive from their parents and how much they offer to their parents. 
Furthermore, for upward financial transfers, although it is estimated in frequencies, 
still it captures the interaction between two generations. In this case, it is 
reasonable to use this finding to confirm the existence of such a feedback model 
in which intergenerational transfers are exchanged to realize reciprocal care. 
Data also show that the very classical feedback model has not been kept 
completely. When parents provide time transfers to their adult children, there is no 
significant difference between daughters and sons. This has shown that 
patrilineality is decaying at least to some extent in contemporary China. This 
phenomenon has been discussed and explained by many scholars, as mentioned 
before in the theoretical section. Probably the one-child policy as well as the 
increasing gender equality has contributed to this change.  
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Combing what has been discussed so far a feedback model can still be applied 
to depict intergenerational interaction although traditional patrilineality is not the 
mainstream any more. The downward transfers that this research focus on can be 
understood as a reflection of this feedback model. However, under what 
mechanism (rational self-interested or altruistic giving) are parents offering these 
downward transfers still needs to be answered by later analysis.  
Before going to analyse the underlying mechanism, the second perspective 
that focuses on the needs of adult children will be discussed first. It is surprising 
to find that the data analysis has rejected both two hypotheses based on this 
perspective. Whether the second generation is a dual-worker family has shown no 
significant effect on parents’ downward transfers. And among those cases where 
the adult children are dual-worker families, whether or not there is a third 
generation is also not significant for how much time transfers parents will offer. 
However, one thing that deserves attention here is that in all cases in the first 
analytical sample, parents provide more time transfers if there is a young third 
generation. This is also true for downward financial transfers when they are 
measured by frequencies. Based on all these results, I would like to argue that 
rather than responding to adult children’s needs passively, it is parents’ active 
choice to offer more downward transfers when there is a young third generation. It 
cannot be concluded, however, that adult children do not need help in 
contemporary China from these findings. What I would like to argue here is 
instead, from the perspective of parents, even though they act as if they are 
responding to adult children’s needs, they are actually taking a more active role in 
providing these help. 
More data results further strengthen this active role of parents in providing 
downward transfers, offering support for the altruistic mechanism. Empirical 
findings have shown that as long as the partner is not unhealthy, healthier parent 
tends to give more downward time transfers. Specifically, with the assumption 
that mothers are taking the main responsibility for providing time transfers (this 
assumption can also be upheld by the data in the second analytical sample), more 
time transfers will be offered with mother’s health conditions getting better as 
long as father is not unhealthy. Results also indicate that when mother is not 
unhealthy, the healthier father is, the more time mother can spare to offer time 
transfers to adult children. This has shown that parents are quite willing to help 
their children when they are in good health conditions. And the healthier they are, 
the more time transfers they will give.  
This willingness to help adult children can also be reflected in terms of 
downward financial transfers. Although only father’s income is available in this 
research, still there is a significant positive relationship between father’s income 
and financial transfers parents give to their adult children. Although the exact 
amounts of financial transfers are not available in the data, at least the frequency 
as well as the probability of offering downward financial transfers increases with 
growth in father’s income.  
Both health condition and income level here are applied as indicators for 
parents’ capability and resources. The argument generated here is that the more 
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capability and resources they have, the more transfers they will offer to their adult 
children.  
About this argument there may be two concerns that I would like to discuss. 
The first is that apart from health condition and income level that are applied here, 
other factors will also influence capability and resources such as available time 
and how far parents live from their children. As mentioned before in section 2.2, 
parents’ age is applied as one indicator to control these factors here and the 
distance of the two generations remains a limitation of this research. Even for 
measurements for income and health conditions, there is room for improvement 
considering that self-report approach applied in the survey may not capture an 
accurate description. In Chen’s research (1998, 149) research, he listed eight daily 
actions and asked elderly people whether they are able to do these independently. 
This may be a better way to evaluate health condition.  
The second concern is that based on current data, one can never say that 
parents are trying their best to helping their adult children since the data cannot 
tell what is “the best”. It is because this reason that I try to avoid using “altruistic 
parenting” and instead apply “willingness to help” when interpreting the results. 
However, in order to show that this willingness to help is mainly for their adult 
children’s interest, as a total opposite to what the rational self-interest mechanism 
argues, in later conclusion part, I will still apply the phrase of “altruism”. In fact, 
if one looks into Chinese history and learns about the family-oriented culture, it is 
probable that he or she would use “altruism” to describe parenting nurtured by 
family orientation. This technical problem of how to measure one’s “trying best” 
will also be mentioned in the limitation section.   
More support for this altruistic mechanism has also shown by the findings 
regarding parents’ happiness. Parents’ happiness is not influenced by the 
downward transfers they give to adult children, showing that they do not regard 
the downward transfers as negative burden. This result, however, can only show 
that from parents’ perspective, they do not see the downward transfers as negative 
burden. It can never be concluded that parents’ welfare is not affected by offering 
downward transfers. Welfare also involves objective material interest and by 
offering downward transfers to others, it is probable that their material interest 
will be harmed.  
To summarize what has been discussed so far, it can be argued that underlying 
the feedback model is parents’ willingness to devote rather than only reciprocal 
exchange. Apart from acknowledging that downward transfers do reflect the 
certain social arrangement of reciprocal intergenerational interaction, the altruistic 
mechanism led by parents’ willingness to offer downward transfers deserve more 
attention and provides a more in-depth answer to the research question. It is this 
willingness/altruistic giving out that underpins the downward transfers offered to 
adult children.  
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6 Limitations and future studies 
Followed with previous analysis of results, this part will discuss limitations of this 
research. Previously some limitations have already been discussed in the data 
section as well as the discussion section. In this part, these limitations will be 
integrated and other limitations concerning the general research design will be 
added. Also some unsolved questions that need future studies are discussed in this 
part.  
First of all, this research has limitations regarding the data source. These 
limitations have already been discussed in previous sections such as incomplete 
information of mother’s income in the first analytical sample and adult children’s 
marital status in the second sample. In addition, the data is based on individuals’ 
self-evaluation on their certain behaviours. However, in order to give a better 
explanation for why parents are offering downward transfers, objective statistics 
as well as more detailed subjective description would be more helpful. For 
instance, the exact amount of financial transfers would be of great help. And 
semi-structured interviews would help us understand how these parents consider 
these downward transfers and some new perspectives may appear in these 
interviews.  
Secondly, a nation-wide perspective is applied here and only rural or urban 
area is controlled. In other words, other district differences have been ignored in 
this research. Considering differences in terms of economic development level as 
well as traditional local culture, it would be meaningful to control more specific 
different districts in future studies. By doing this, one advantage would be the 
comparability of income levels. Absolute values are used as measurements for 
income in this research, taking no account of local economic development. 
Considering the gigantic gap between different areas in China in terms of 
economic development, it would also be a good idea to measure income level 
after adjusting for local living cost and average income in future studies that still 
apply a nation-wide perspective. 
Thirdly, intentional limitations are made in the process of defining the 
research question and making research design in order to make this research more 
focused and straightforward. This research has set specific standards when 
selecting research objects: the two couples of the first and second generation have 
to be married and alive. This may exclude some other factors that may affect 
intergenerational relationship. It would be interesting to look into some special 
groups such as widow parents in further studies. Moreover, intangible 
intergenerational transfers like emotional exchange are not considered in this 
research, neither are long-term intergenerational transfers. All these need more 
future studies.  
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Apart from these, this research focuses on why parents are giving downward 
transfers, not discussing whether these downward transfers per se have 
experienced any changes. However, by looking into the latter question, it will also 
help analyse why parents are offering downward transfers. The data (Table 3.3.1.1) 
show that about one third (35.23%) of the respondents (as adult children) have 
never received time transfers from their parents and the number goes to 45.55% in 
terms of financial transfers. How is this compared to situations in previous times? 
Does this indicate a trend of decrease in downward transfers? Through looking 
into how the downward transfers change through history, it is probable that some 
new insights will be achieved for understanding the downward transfers given by 
parents.  
In the final part of this section, I want to discuss some related thoughts that 
have been developed during this research and these thoughts may be interesting 
topics in future studies. One is that in Table 4.2, there is a significant relationship 
between upward and downward financial transfers and I have interpreted it as a 
culture of “courtesy demands reciprocity” in China. Then what is the role of this 
culture in the downward transfers? Another issue is that time transfers and 
financial transfers are analysed separately in this research, but it is probable that 
these two may have interaction mechanism. For instance, they will be 
complement to each other sometimes. One example is that financial transfers may 
be a substitute when parents and their children live far away from each other and 
time transfers are difficult to realize. Then how should this complementary 
interaction be taken into consideration when studying the downward transfers? 
The final issue is a technical problem of measurement. As mentioned before, 
traditional culture always establishes altruistic parenting but how can we use 
pragmatic measurements to verify this altruism in a more convincing way? How 
can one tell that parents are doing their best to help their adult children? How to 
verify this “best”? All these issues may be discussed further in future studies.  
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7 Conclusion 
In this final section of this thesis, a brief overview will be given for this research 
and some implications of this research will be discussed. In general, this research 
focuses on the question that why parents are giving downward transfers to their 
adult children or what factors may explain these downward transfers. To answer 
this question, the first step is taken to look into previous studies and three 
different perspectives are generated as potential explanations for the downward 
transfers. Briefly speaking, the first perspective regards the downward transfers as 
a reflection of the classical feedback model, which is a certain social arrangement 
for reciprocal care among generations. While the second perspective focuses on 
the needs of adult children and the downward transfers given by parents are 
interpreted as responses to these needs. The final perspective, with two competing 
mechanisms, provides two different interpretations for whether rationale or 
altruism holds more weight in parents’ downward transfers described in the 
previous two perspectives.  
Equipped with these three perspectives, the second step is then carried out to 
collect data. After selecting two analytical samples from CGSS2006, logistic 
regressions are run for three sets of models. Downward time transfers, downward 
financial transfers and parents’ happiness are three outcomes for these models. 
With the results shown by these models, discussions are given combing the three 
theoretical perspectives.  
For the first perspective, the results have shown that the feedback model is 
still alive in China although the patrilineality is no longer the mainstream. Thus, 
the feedback model does capture the downward transfers to some extent. As for 
the need-based perspective, there is no significant result showing that the 
downward transfers are parents’ response to their children’s needs coming from a 
dual-worker family in an underdeveloped welfare system. Instead, parents are 
shown to devote more transfers (both time and financial) to adult children if there 
is a young third generation, no matter the second generation is a dual-worker 
family or not. Based on this, I conclude that the downward transfers are reflecting 
parents’ own willingness to offer transfers rather than just passive responses to 
adult children’s needs. This willingness is also confirmed by other significant 
relationships shown in the data analysis. More downward financial transfers are 
made if parents have higher income and more downward time transfers are 
provided if parents are in better health condition. Also their happiness has not 
been harmed at all if they devote more downward transfers. All these have shown 
that parents are really helping their children rather than offer downward transfers 
for their own interest. 
Combining all these findings, it is concluded that the downward transfers do 
reflect the feedback model of intergenerational reciprocal care but more 
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significantly, it is mainly the altruistic mechanism nurtured by family-oriented 
culture that is underpinning the downward transfers within this feedback model.  
Looking through the whole process of this research, there are limitations 
generated from data sources as well as from intentional plans for limiting the 
research scope. However, some limitations can be also regarded as an advantage. 
For instance, subjective evaluations are applied to make many measurements in 
this data. While this may not capture an accurate description, it can also be 
regarded as a merit when the research purpose is to dig out also subjective 
motivations underlying behaviours. During the interpretation and discussion 
process, these limitations have been integrated into analysis so that a more critical 
view can be achieved to understand the finding results. Also some problems as 
well as suggestions are raised for future studies based on these limitations like the 
role of “courtesy demanding reciprocity” culture in downward transfers and 
whether financial and time transfers complement each other.  
Some implications of this research would be discussed in the very end of this 
thesis. This research has shown that the altruistic mechanism is actually 
underpinning the downward transfers. As analysed in the theoretical section, this 
mechanism is nurtured by the traditional culture of family orientation. Since it is 
really difficult for this kind of cultural influence to dismiss in a short term, it is 
probable that in near future, we can still see parents offering their adult children 
with various transfers. However, this does not mean that the existing problems 
regarding the welfare system can be ignored. Although parents do not see these 
transfers as extra burden, still their material interests are being harmed. As Tao 
(2011) argued, the underdeveloped welfare system (especially those regarding 
birth insurance and preschool education and care) is actually hurting the parents 
who are offering what the social system should have offered. They are not seeing 
this as extra burden does not mean that there needs no improvement for the 
welfare system.  
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8 Executive summary 
This research focuses on the downward transfers offered by parents to their adult 
children in contemporary China. The research question is what factors can explain 
these downward transfers. Specifically, only tangible transfers are discussed in 
this research, namely time transfers and financial transfers.  
To answer this research question, previous studies are analysed to provide 
potential explanations. Generally three perspectives are achieved from these 
research. For the first one, downward transfers are a reflection of the classical 
feedback model in China. This model refers to a certain social arrangement for 
reciprocal care and according to this model there should be a positive correlation 
between upward financial transfers and downward time transfers after the adult 
child gets married. Also the characteristic of patrilineality indicates that 
downward time transfers are mainly offered to sons rather than daughters. While 
the second perspective argues that these downward transfers are parents’ 
responses to the needs of their adult children if the adult children are a dual-earner 
family since when two partners both work outside, they will not have enough time 
to do household duty. Another more intense need comes from these dual-worker 
families with a young grandchild (the third generation). This is due to the 
underdeveloped welfare system regarding birth insurance as well as preschool 
education and care. The third perspective provides two competing claims about 
what mechanism (rational or altruistic) is the main buttress for downward 
transfers described in previous two perspectives. Those who are for rational 
mechanism maintain that with decaying filial piety, parents are becoming more 
self-interested and the downward transfers are a kind of investment they make 
with the intention of getting return from their adult children. Thus, the more 
independent they are, the less they need from their adult children, the less 
transfers they will provide. If they have to offer help to respond to their adult 
children’s needs, then extra burden will be caused and they will be unhappier. In 
contrast, those who vote for altruistic mechanism argue that the culture of family 
orientation has cultivated altruistic parenting and parents are always willing to 
help their children based on their capability and resources. The more capable they 
are, or the more resources they have, the more transfers they will provide to help 
their adult children. Specifically, income and health condition are applied here to 
indicate parents’ independence, capability and available resources. Apart from 
these three perspectives, some controls are also generated from previous studies, 
including rural or urban areas and parents’ age. Age is regarded as an extra 
control for parents’ need as well as a rough control for parents’ available time that 
is also relevant for indicating capability to offer downward transfers.  
Equipped with theories, a database based on a nation-wide survey conducted 
in 2006 (CGSS2006) is applied as the data source in this research. This survey 
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includes an extra questionnaire where respondents answer questions regarding 
intergenerational relationship, involving the transfers between different 
generations. Since different information is collected for respondents as the 
parental generation and respondents as the filial generation, two analytical 
samples are selected from this database based on different research purposes 
(different response variables). The general standard for selecting analytical sample 
is that both partners of the parental and filial generation are currently married and 
alive. (Although this standard is not strictly met for the second analytical sample 
due to limitations of the data.) 
After achieving these two analytical samples, three sets of models are 
established for three outcome variables respectively, namely downward time 
transfers, downward financial transfers and parents’ happiness. Since these three 
outcome variables are either ordered variables with 5 levels or dichotomous 
variables, ordered logistic regression and binary logistic regression are chosen as 
statistical models. Based on the three perspectives, variables of upward financial 
transfers, gender of adult children, parents’ health condition and income level, 
whether the adult child is in a dual-worker family and whether there is a young 
third generation are involved as key predictors in the first two sets of models for 
predicting downward time and financial transfers. While in the third set of model 
analysing parents’ happiness, downward transfers (including time and financial) 
are included as main explanatory variables. For each set of models analysing one 
certain outcome, several models are run for different groups of cases holding a 
certain characteristic with the expectation that a comprehensive picture can be 
drawn to understand the outcome variable.  
After that, empirical findings of these models are interpreted and discussed 
combing the three perspectives. For the feedback model, a significant relationship 
does appear between the upward financial transfers and downward time transfers. 
And the patrilineality hypothesis is rejected since there is no significant difference 
between adult sons and adult daughters in terms of time transfers they receive 
from their parents. This shows that a non-patrilineality feedback model does 
capture some explanation for the downward transfers. However, the significant 
correlation between upward financial transfers and downward time transfers 
cannot be interpreted as a causal relationship. As for the second perspective, data 
cannot show strong evidence for the argument that parents are giving transfers as 
a response to their adult children’s needs if the adult children are a dual-worker 
family (especially those with a young grandchild). The only relevant significant 
result provided by data is the significant relationship between downward time 
transfers and whether there is a young grandchild (the third generation) when all 
cases are included (no matter dual-worker family or not). Specifically, parents 
will offer more time as well as financial transfers if there is a young grandchild. 
However, this significance disappeared when only including cases where the 
second generation is a dual-worker family. In this case, it would be more 
reasonable to argue that it is parents’ own willingness to help more when there is 
a young third generation rather than they are responding passively to the adult 
children’s needs as a dual-worker family with a young grandchild. Apart from 
these, other findings further strengthen this willingness of parents’ to offer 
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transfers, as argued by the altruistic mechanism. With increasing income levels, 
parents tend to give more financial transfers. Also more downward transfers will 
be delivered if parents are in better health condition. Furthermore, neither 
downward time transfers nor downward financial transfers have shown significant 
effect on parents’ happiness. All these findings have provided support for the 
altruistic parenting illustrated in the third perspective, showing that it is parents’ 
own willingness to help that underpins the downward transfers. And offering 
downward transfers are not extra burden in their perspectives.  
Combing all these findings, it is concluded that the downward transfers do 
reflect the feedback model of intergenerational reciprocal care but more 
importantly, it is mainly the altruistic parenting cultivated by family-oriented 
culture that is supporting the downward transfers within this feedback model. 
However, one can never conclude absolute parental altruism only based on these 
findings because technically, the data cannot show whether or not parents are 
doing their best to help their children.  
Looking through the whole process of this research, there are limitations 
generated from data sources as well as from intentional plans for limiting the 
research scope. However, some limitations can be also regarded as an advantage. 
For instance, subjective evaluations are applied to make many measurements in 
this data. While this may not capture an accurate description, it can also be 
regarded as a merit when the research purpose is to dig out also subjective 
motivations underlying behaviours. Therefore, during the interpretation and 
discussion process, these limitations have been integrated into analysis so that a 
more critical view can be achieved to understand the finding results. Also some 
problems as well as suggestions are raised for future studies based on these 
limitations like the role of “courtesy demanding reciprocity” culture in downward 
transfers and whether financial and time transfers complement each other.  
In the very end of this thesis, some implications are discussed. This research 
has shown that the altruistic mechanism is actually supporting the downward 
transfers. As analysed in the theoretical section, this mechanism is nurtured by the 
traditional culture of family orientation. Since it is really difficult for this kind of 
cultural influence to dismiss in a short term, it is probable that in near future, we 
can still see parents offering their adult children with various transfers. However, 
this does not mean that the existing problems regarding the welfare system can be 
ignored. Although parents do not see these transfers as extra burden, still their 
material interests are being harmed because it is these parents that are providing 
what should have been offered by the welfare system. They are not seeing this as 
extra burden does not mean that there needs no improvement.  
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11 Appendix: results for Brand test 
Brand test in Stata is used to test the parallel regression assumption for ordered 
logistic regression. A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel 
regression assumption has been violated. For all models, there is no significant 
test statistic (p > 0.05), indicating that all models have met this assumption (if 
OLR is applied for this model). In following tables, p-value is reported for every 
model.  
 
Table A1 Brant Test Results for Models Predicting Downward Time Transfers 
 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 Model 1.5 
All 0.87 0.81 0.64 0.81 0.87 
Upward financial transfers 0.89 0.87 0.70 0.06 0.59 
Gender of adult child 0.60 0.75 0.89 0.43 0.25 
Father’s health 0.45  0.64 0.49 0.47 
Mother’s health 0.58 0.29  0.98 0.83 
Have a young grandchild or not 0.30 0.38 0.12  0.33 
Dual-worker family or not 0.45 0.33 0.48 0.81  
Father’s age 0.80 0.54 0.41 0.92 0.56 
Mother’s age 0.52 0.21 0.43 0.94 0.43 
Father’s income 0.88 0.51 0.19 0.83 0.88 
Adult children’s income 0.77 0.74 0.57 0.71 0.99 
Rural or urban 0.94 0.79 0.65 0.84 0.89 
Note: p-values are reported for every variable in a certain model.  
 
 
Table A1 Brant Test Results for Models Predicting Downward Financial Transfers 
Variable Model 2.1 (5 levels) Model 2.2 (2 levels) 
All  0.06  
There is no necessary 
for Brant test since 
binary logistic 
regression is used 
here. 
Father’s income 0.05 
Gender of adult child 0.21 
Have a young grandchild or not 0.61  
Dual-worker family or not 0.99 
Upward financial transfers (3 levels) 0.59 
Upward financial transfers (2 levels)  
Father’s age 0.66 
Mother’s age  
Mother’s age (squared) 0.16 
Father’s health 0.64 
Mother’s health 0.62  
Adult child’s income 0.25 
Rural or urban 0.16 
        Note: p-values are reported for every variable in a certain model.  
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Table A3 Brant Test Results for Models Predicting Parents’ Happiness 
Variable Model 3.1 (All parents) Model 3.2 (Mothers) 
All 0.46 0.77 
Downward time transfers 0.35 0.27 
Downward financial transfers 0.86 0.73 
Respondent’s health (5 levels) 0.25  
Respondent’s health (3 levels)  0.08 
Partner’s health 0.25 0.49 
Respondent’s income 0.89 0.98 
Partner’s income 0.67 0.86 
Gender of respondent 0.27  
Age of respondent 0.72 0.99 
Upward time transfers 0.82 0.85 
Upward financial transfers 0.10 0.23 
Rural or urban 0.06 0.43 
         Note: p-values are reported for every variable in a certain model.  
 
